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This thesis will attempt to provide the optimal policy prescription for the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) Army on how to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) the North 
Korean people in the case of their regime collapse. It is important to know how the 
likelihood of environment in which post-conflict reconstruction efforts will be 
implemented. The viability of any contingency plan should be assessed, based on an 
assumption about the environment being in probable upheaval. However, little analysis of 
the viability of the contingency plan, including the DDR program, has been undertaken in 
the context of North Korean regime collapse. Especially, the research about expectations 
and assumptions related to the possible North Korean attitude and probable post-regime 
collapse environment has been rare. The contingency planning, thus, needs further 
research and empirical supporting data, which can enhance its viability in practice. Given 
this perspective, this thesis attempts to predict the North Korean people’s possible 
attitude in their upheaval, based on analysis about the current regime’s control system 
and recent changes. This thesis also assumes different scenarios in which DDR would be 
implemented to reconstruct a post-conflict society, by differentiating critical uncertainties 
in each case.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will attempt to provide the optimal policy prescription for the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) Army on how to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) the North 
Korean people in the case of their regime collapse. In 2008, former Commander, 
Combined Forces Command, General Walter Sharp announced that “response plans to an 
upheaval in North Korea had been prepared … South Korean and U.S. militaries had 
made thorough preparations not only for an all-out war against North Korea, but also for 
scenarios such as instability in the country or a regime change.”1 However, little analysis 
of the viability of the contingency plan, including the DDR program, has been undertaken. 
The plan, thus, needs further research and empirical supporting data, which can enhance 
its viability in practice. Given this perspective, this thesis attempts to predict the North 
Korean people’s possible attitude during a period of upheaval, based on the current 
regime’s control system and recent changes. This thesis also assumes different scenarios 
in which DDR would be implemented to reconstruct a post-conflict society. Thus, the 
primary question this research seeks to answer is: What is the probable environment in 
which DDR will be implemented in the case of North Korean regime collapse? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
A DDR program provides essential elements of post-conflict stability that reduce 
the likelihood of resumed conflict. While the reconstruction of North Korea will entail a 
range of tasks such as security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, 
and governance and participation, the security pillar should precede all others to provide 
a stable condition on which other reconstruction tasks can be implemented.2 Given that a 
security pillar is the precondition for achieving a successful outcome in the other 
reconstruction pillars, DDR, as the initial task of security reconstruction, can serve as a 
                                                 
1 “OPLAN 5029 Risks Ceding South Korean Sovereignty to the U.S.,” The Hankyoreh, November 2, 
2009, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/385351.html. 
2 “Post-conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework,” Association of the United States Army and Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, May 2002, 3. 
 2 
vital confidence-building measure in the early days after cessation of hostilities. Since 
dealing with former combatants is one of the most often recurring challenges of any post-
conflict reconstruction, failure to return ex-combatants to civilian life or to promote them 
into a legitimate security institution leads to long-term difficulties across all areas of 
reconstruction. Fortunately, prior instances of implemented stability operations and 
reconstruction missions in post-conflict societies, conducted mostly by the United 
Nations (UN) and the United States, have accumulated many lessons for disarming, 
demobilizing, and reintegrating former combatants.  
Given that North Korea is one of the world’s most militarized and unstable states, 
the contingency plan in the case of its regime collapse should be carefully planned, based 
on those lessons. Since North Korea maintains both armed forces of more than one 
million members, which heavily rely on government-provided food, and huge stocks of 
conventional weapons as well as a few nuclear weapons, North Korean regime collapse 
could unleash a series of far-reaching regional and global catastrophes, ranging from 
humanitarian crises to nuclear proliferation.3 In addition, since adopting the Four-Point 
Military Lines in 1962, North Korea officially has pursued arming the entire population, 
including youth and females.4 In this sense, irrespective of the upheaval scenario, the 
establishment of security and stability in the absence of governance should address the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the North Korean people. DDR, thus, 
should be a priority mission after North Korea regime collapse.5 
C. PROBLEM AND HYPHOTHESIS 
Developing the contingency DDR plan in the case of a North Korea regime 
collapse raises many questions: What is the likelihood of the collapse of North Korea in 
the foreseeable future? What is the range of plausible scenarios for a North Korea 
collapse? Who is responsible for stabilizing the region? From what source will those 
                                                 
3 Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and 
Requirements,” International Security 36,  no. 2 (Fall 2011): 84. 
4 Defense White Paper 2012 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2013), 27. 
5 “North Korea Contingency Planning and U.S.-ROK Cooperation,” Center for U.S.-Korean Policy, 
The Asia Foundation, 2009, 9. 
 3 
conducting stabilization and reconstruction in North Korea get their legitimacy? What 
will be the likely attitude of North Koreans being disarmed? Will other stakeholders 
beyond South Korea and the United States, especially China, intervene in the situation? 
These kinds of issues cannot be ignored in developing the contingency plan, and 
assumptions about North Korea in an anarchic situation are indeed scenario-dependent.  
Fully answering these broad questions with regard to the uncertainties of North 
Korean collapse scenarios is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the thesis does not 
simply make single assumptions about these questions. Rather, the research uses  a range 
of assumptions concerning the possible future situations in which DDR will be 
implemented.  This will enable policy-making recommendations that are sensitive to 
future uncertainty.  In particular, research will be conducted based on two assumptions. 
Since the aim of this thesis is to provide a policy prescription to the ROK Army, 
the first assumption is that, among the many stakeholders involved, South Korea will be 
the main actor that carries out DDR in North Korea. The stabilizing forces probably will 
be multilateral, composed of the ROK Army, the U.S. Army, or even the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), but the thesis assumes they will be led by the ROK Army. Of 
course, this assumption is not free from legal and political debate. Therefore, the thesis 
does not exclude the possibility of external intervention in the implementation of DDR. 
Especially, Chinese analysts and officials currently view the insertion of any foreign 
military forces into North Korea as an illegal military intervention.6 The thesis, therefore, 
will investigate how this probable external intervention might impede the DDR process 
by examining other relevant cases.   
Second, the analysis assumes that the collapse of the North Korean regime leaves 
no central control over its entire territory. In such a situation, the North Korean regime 
and its government do not function anymore and its people will be subject to chaotic 
disorder. The assumption, however, does not exclude the possibility of resistance by the 
                                                 
6 Bennett and Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” 93; Paul B. 
Stares and Joel S. Wit, Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2009), 6, http://www.cfr.org/world/preparing-sudden-change-north-korea/p18019; Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, China’s Impact on Korean Peninsula Unification and Questions 
for the Senate (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 3, 10. 
 4 
North Korean people. The case of German reunification was successful due to an East 
German cooperative attitude and the country’s willingness to be accepted into Western 
Germany. Such a benign scenario has value for the contingency plan to some extent. The 
Iraq experience, however, shows the risk of military planning that assumes no resistance. 
Uncontrolled Iraqi military dismantlement, after the Saddam regime’s collapse, also 
provides another angle from which to depict a probable situation in North Korea.7 Thus, 
this thesis assumes that insurgency is more likely in the North Korean case. Since North 
Korea is one of the most propagandistic and indoctrinated states, it is too optimistic to 
assume that there will be no insurgent movement against stabilizing forces. Therefore, the 
thesis focuses on the other cases where coercive methods of DDR were implemented 
despite some resistance by those being disarmed. 
Given these assumptions, the author hypothesizes that these critical uncertainties, 
the attitude of North Koreans being disarmed and possible external intervention, bearing 
on the basic assumptions will be critical exogenous factors that affect the process of DDR 
in North Korea’s upheaval. A preliminary look at previous practice and academic 
research suggests that DDR has been more commonly impeded by unpredictable 
exogenous factors rather than endogenous ones.8  
Research for this thesis, therefore, will assess exogenous factors in the North 
Korean case. It will begin by assuming the North Korean people’s possible attitude 
toward the efforts of reconstructing, DDR, by the outsiders. Then, it will differentiate 
dimensions of uncertain variables and describe how those exogenous factors interact and 
create the different environments in which DDR will be implemented.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Conceptualizing DDR 
Substantial literature on DDR has been published in response to numerous UN-
led DDR initiatives around the world. Since the early 1990s, when the rapid rise in civil 
                                                 
7 Bennett and Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” 109. 
8 United Nations Security Council, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 30. 
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wars and ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era required a systemic approach to post-
conflict reconstruction, the UN has continued the conceptualization and practice of 
peacebuilding. In this context, a set of processes for dealing with former combatants, 
known as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), has been evolved by 
practitioners and scholars, and it has become a standard element in post-conflict 
reconstruction. The Brahimi report notes that “DDR programs are essential elements of 
post-conflict stability that reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict.”9 The report has 
served as the stepping stone for improving UN capacity to meet surging demand in war-
torn society reconstruction. How noteworthy, then, that the Brahimi report recognizes the 
importance of DDR. Recognizing the need for multi-dimensional peacebuilding missions, 
the UN Security Council has included DDR in all mandates of the last seven 
peacekeeping missions since 2000.10 
While the UN has published much literature on DDR, the UN Secretary General’s 
note to the General Assembly provides what has become the accepted definition of DDR 
within the UN system.11  
It defines the elements of DDR as follows: Disarmament is “the collection, 
documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light 
and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local populace.” 12 
Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms-management programs, 
and it is best carried out when those being disarmed are voluntary and cooperative. With 
a lack of trust between those being disarmed and the forces overseeing disarmament, the 
process, however, often causes a security dilemma among the people. That is, because 
                                                 
9 William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moria K. Shanahan, “The Brahimi Report 
and the Future of UN Peace Operations” (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 27.  
10 United Nations Security Council, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, 9.  
11 United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 
Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (New 
York, NY: United Nations, 2011), 25; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DDR in 
Peace Operations: A Retrospective (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 4; United Nations Security 
Council, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace 
Operations, 10. 
12 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DDR in Peace Operations: A 
Retrospective, 4. 
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being disarmed means abandoning basic and sometimes the only means of protection, it 
is difficult for some former combatants to trust other parties and to participate in 
disarmament without a security guarantee. Hence, some groups and individuals may 
hesitate to cooperate or even refuse to take part in the disarmament process. The previous 
lines of research acknowledge that disarmament may occur in two stages: a voluntary 
disarmament process followed by measures that are more coercive.13 In short, high levels 
of trust between the people being disarmed and those disarming them, along with a 
security guarantee by the disarming units, should take precedence over the 
implementation of disarmament.  
Demobilization is defined as “the act of changing from a state of war to a state of 
peace, including disbanding or discharging troops,” and it involves the formal and 
controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.14 
Demobilization starts from identifying and gathering former combatants, and the task 
extends to the processing of individual former combatants in temporary centers and the 
massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose. It also involves not only 
physically dismantling combatant chains of command but also replacing belligerent 
group loyalties with more appropriate group affiliations and restoring their identity as 
part of the national population. The UN calls this process the first stage of demobilization 
and differentiates it from the second stage, which encompasses the support package 
provided to the demobilized.15 In short, in the first stage of demobilization, the tasks of 
identifying and targeting former combatants and armed groups for demobilization are 
significant.  
During the second stage of demobilization, called reinsertion, former combatants 
are provided short-term material assistance to help cover their basic needs prior to the 
                                                 
13 United Nations Security Council, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, 13; Department of the Army, Stability Operations, 
Field Manual FM3-07, October 2008, 6–19; Shane R. Doolan, “Coercive Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration (DDR): Can It Be Successful?” (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 7.  
14 Department of State, Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2006, 36; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DDR 
in Peace Operations, 4; United Nations Security Council, Second Generation Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, 10. 
15 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DDR in Peace Operations, 4. 
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longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion can include provision of food, clothes, 
shelter, medical services, short-term education, training and employment, and this short-
term support can last up to one year. In this sense, providing sufficient material support in 
a timely manner and securing distribution of provisions should be considered at every 
level of the process. Otherwise, the problems caused by funding delays and gaps in 
implementing the program undermine the whole process, as was seen in the cases of 
Afghanistan, Liberia and Congo.16 
While reinsertion functions as short-term assistance for ex-combatants, the UN 
sees reintegration as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and 
gain sustainable employment and income.” 17  It includes programs imparting basic 
vocational skills, assistance finding employment in local communities and support for ex-
combatant resettlement in civilian society. Long-term reintegration helps ex-combatants 
become socially and economically embedded in their communities. As such, it makes 
significant contributions economically, socially and politically to the reconstruction of 
fragile or failed states. In this sense, reintegration is essentially a social and economic 
process and cannot be separated from justice and reconciliation programs that are part of 
the broader transition process. Thus, successful reintegration is hard to achieve and tends 
to be long term and costly, requiring coordinated efforts that may need external assistance.   
2. Lessons Learned  
The first UN actions dealing with DDR date back to Security Council resolution 
650 (1990), which mandated that the United Nations Observer Group in Central America 
include the demobilization of anti-government elements in Nicaragua.18 Since that time, 
experience and know-how for success have been accumulated within not only the UN but 
also related states and international institutions. 
                                                 
16 Wolf-Christian Paes, “The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in 
Liberia,” International Peacekeeping, 12  no. 2 (2005): 254; Caroline A. Hartzell, “Missed Opportunities: 
The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, 2011, 3–4; Severene 
Autesserre, The Trouble with Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12. 
17 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DDR in Peace Operations, 4. 
18 Ibid., 16. 
 8 
The early literature on DDR focused on a small number of case studies. While 
most DDR literature has emerged since 2000, Mats R. Berdal, one of the early writers on 
DDR, emphasized an integrated and holistic approach that entails institutional, political 
and operational requirements. He drew on failed cases, such as Congo.19 He concluded 
that implementing DDR is difficult within short time frames and when many stakeholders 
are involved. It is noteworthy how early in the experience of DDR the need for an 
integrated approach was recognized.  In the same vein, Nicole Ball emphasized an 
integrated approach and noted that “it should be undertaken as an integral component of a 
broad conflict.”20 She also provided specific policy recommendations on the basis of 
early experiences in Africa. Ball especially mentioned the importance of the political 
willingness of the involved parties and sufficient economic support from the international 
community. These early efforts, nonetheless, recognized the dangers of drawing general 
lessons from diverse experiences since those could distort the details of each individual 
case. 
A more comprehensive guide was made in the UN’s Integrated DDR Standards 
(IDDRS) in 2006. It amounted to a significant initiative to promote an integrated 
approach between UN agencies and other actors in the DDR process. In more than 700 
pages, it provided guidance for an integrated approach and effective DDR process for 
those planning and implementing DDR processes. Covering a broad scope of related 
issues--such as personnel and finance for the mission, social and economic integration of 
former combatants, the importance of the role of women and children and health and 
HIV--, IDDRS suggested the key characteristics of DDR: people centered; flexible, 
transparent and accountable; nationally owned; integrated and well planned.21 While this 
ambitious effort enhances the effectiveness and integrity of the DDR program in practice,  
 
                                                 
19 Mats R. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996).  
20 Nicole Ball, Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa, ed. Krishna Kumar 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 1997), 15. 
21 United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (New York, NY: United Nations, 
2006), 8–15.  
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ongoing projects such as those in Sudan, Haiti, and Sri Lanka still demonstrate how 
hazardous it can be relying on previous lessons without considering the specific context 
in which DDR is implemented.  
The most recent guide for DDR was made in 2010, by launching the Second 
Generation DDR. Acknowledging the complexity of conflicts, the Second Generation 
DDR provided valuable lessons from past experience. It identified key recurring 
challenges that have undermined the integrated effort of DDR program, based on the 
experiences in Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia. However, the Second 
Generation DDR also did not suggest a permanent formulation for DDR success. It 
concluded that the complexity of the environment could be addressed by responding to 
the specific context of each case.22 
3. Applicability to North Korea 
The assumption that the collapse of North Korea will generate an anarchic 
situation is indeed scenario-dependent. Most literature, thus, has focused on assuming 
scenarios about North Korean regime collapse, covering uncertain factors in a broad 
sense and providing somewhat limited policy recommendation to the ROK-US alliance. 
While these early efforts called attention to the need of preparing for upheaval, Bruce W. 
Bennett and Jennifer Lind suggest a more specific policy to the case of the North Korean 
regime falling. They specify the military requirements to meet a chaotic situation and 
estimate that 260,000–400,000 ground forces personnel will be required to stabilize 
North Korea in its upheaval.23 They point out requirements to disarm and demobilize the 
North Korean military. However, their policy recommendations are based on assumptions 
that are too optimistic because they exclude the possibility of external intervention and 
resistance from those being disarmed. They also do not provide specific detail on how 
North Korean former combatants can be demobilized.  While their research valuably 
provides a more detailed policy recommendation on one probable situation in North 
                                                 
22 United Nations Security Council, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, 1–30. 
23 Bennett and Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” 86. 
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Korea than other analyses, the research for this thesis covers a much broader range of the 
critical uncertainties bearing on prospects for success of future DDR activities in North 
Korea. 
As previous lines of research suggested, many exogenous factors in the case of 
North Korean regime collapse cannot be listed at this moment. Thus, examining the 
viability of the DDR program in the contingency plan is not an easy task. Former Chief 
of DDR, Gromo Alex notes, “The challenges for DDR cannot be listed or calibrated. At 
every turn we find something new that we need to address: a combatant’s reluctance, 
difficult terrain, inadequate logistics, insufficient staffing, intervention by political 
leaders of armed groups, and insecurity risks.”24 Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, 
also acknowledges that successful DDR programs use many approaches designed for 
specific security environments. Each program reflects the unique aspects of the situation, 
culture and character of the state. In this sense, generalizing about the element of either a 
successful DDR program or failed cases can be dangerous since it can distort the details 
of each individual case.  
However, that is not to say that assessing the possible implementation of a DDR 
program in North Korea is impossible. Some basic principles found in the case study 
should be considered to supplement the plan. Further research in terms of North Korean 
governing institutions, military organization and character of community should be 
conducted along with ROK-U.S. alliance inter-agency coordination. More research at the 
micro level is also needed. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Research began with literature about North Korean society. Since North Korea is 
one of the most isolated states in the world, available information is highly limited. 
Nonetheless, some scholars’ close observation into the closed society provides valuable 
information about the control system of North Korean society. By utilizing this 
information, this research identifies four major elements that constitute the regime’s 
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control system. Then, the author makes an assumption by analyzing these elements at the 
micro level. Especially, the study focuses on how the attitude and willingness of those 
being disarmed and the intervention of external actors could affect the DDR process and 
how those factors can be managed.  
In addition, this thesis uses a variety of sources: mostly UN literature, government 
reports (those of USAID, the Department of State and the Department of Defense), policy 
papers from the World Bank and other relevant agencies, and scholarly journals, as well 
as books on DDR and North Korea. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will consist of four chapters. The introduction begins with the concept 
of DDR, explaining how the DDR concept has been developed and what lessons have 
been accumulated. Providing principles and guidelines for DDR from past experiences, it 
also explains why DDR is important in the case of a North Korean regime collapse. 
Chapter II addresses the foundation of the North Korean control mechanism. In order to 
anticipate the North Korean people’s attitude in the absence of governance and control, 
one should know how the current regime’s control system is working. Thus, this study 
identifies the elements of the control system and how these elements were established 
and have been changed up to now. Chapter III will explain the different environments in 
which DDR will potentially be implemented. Different collapse scenarios are studied. 
Different scenarios are created, by differentiating critical and uncertain variables. One 
might argue that it is impossible to make a precise prediction regarding North Korean 
regime collapse. This is true since there are too many uncertain variables regarding the 
issue. However, the purpose of scenario making is not to predict the future but to prepare 
for a wide range of uncertainties. Thus, it is not important to make a precise scenario. 
Rather, the plausibility of scenarios is necessary to prepare for uncertain situations. To 
conclude, Chapter IV provides a policy recommendation based on the research findings.   
 12 
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II. NORTH KOREAN ATTITUDE TOWARD UPHEAVAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) were published offering 
valuable guidance in implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
former combatants in the post-conflict environment. IDDRS also suggests a set of 
preconditions that should be in place before a DDR begins. These are the signing of a 
negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR, trust in the peace 
process, willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR and a minimum 
guarantee of security.25 Previous DDR experiences of the UN in Afghanistan, Haiti, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, however, show that these conditions are 
often not met. In a majority of the cases examined, all warring parties are not included in 
the stabilization and reconstruction process; or even worse, in many cases, these target 
groups are not identified. In this regard, identifying pre-conditions in which DDR is to be 
implemented and the population’s motivations to resist against stabilizing forces should 
be pursued to guarantee the success of DDR in the case of North Korea regime collapse. 
Furthermore, as the UN research of Second Generation DDR notes, it is also important to 
look beyond the identified target, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in this case, and to 
consider a possibility of insurgent movement from unidentified groups in the 
population.26  
Intuitively, it is possible for someone to assume that North Korean citizens will 
greet foreign forces warmly at the end of sixty years of dictatorship since they have been 
victims of oppression and tyranny. The more ideal expectation for the ROK stabilizing 
forces will be the North Korean people’s anti-government protests in an attempt to expel  
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a remnant of the former authoritarian regime. These are possible scenarios, and these 
kind of benign scenarios provide a basic framework that can be adjusted as circumstances 
require, as Bruce Bennett argues.27  
It can be hypothesized, however, that a cordial welcome is not likely to happen. 
The majority of the North Korean people will be likely to remain passive without 
knowing the progress of the situation, and although it will be highly affected by variable 
factors such as the emergence of an illegitimate government and organized riots of local 
military leaders, their initial response to the ROK stabilizing forces will vary by the 
degree of people’s loyalty to the former regime.  
To support this idea, the thesis will identify the four major elements of the 
regime’s control methods, namely, the social control system, songbun system, ideological 
indoctrination and role of the KPA. The possible attitude of the people in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to their regime collapse will be suggested by 
analyzing how these elements have contributed to the North Korean regime’s 
sustainability and how recent changes of these elements will affect the people’s way of 
thinking and behaving in the absence of control. Then, possible scenarios of post-collapse 
North Korea in which DDR is implemented will be suggested.  
B. INSIDE NORTH KOREA 
North Korea is one of the most isolated and closed states in the world. As many 
analysts and scholars point out, it is difficult to look inside this closed society and get 
accurate information on how the control system in North Korea is functioning. Available 
information is limited to superficial observance of invited visitors, such as scholars, 
reporters, and high-level officials, and testimony of defectors. It is likely that this kind of 
information is biased and partial since North Korea shows them what its government 
wants to show. Considering North Koreans’ restricted freedom of movement within their 
country, information from defectors could also be biased and incomplete. However, 
North Korea has survived and still maintains its control over the population. The author 
would argue that North Korea’s control mechanism until the 1990s had been effective 
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and penetrated into its society more deeply than one can imagine, to the extent that it 
enabled an unstable regime to persist up to now. Despite the fact that North Korea has 
been changing due to an economic downturn since the 1990s, the country is likely to be 
still affected by this control system to some extent. In this context, this main section 
reviews the historical foundation of each control method of the North Korean regime: 
various social control systems, the songbun system, ideological indoctrination, and the 
role of the KPA. Then, this section also examines implications of recent changes within 
these elements since the 1990s economic downturn.  
1. Foundation of the Social Control System 
The control system is constituted of not only surveillance of people’s daily life 
but also control over people’s basic needs, such as food and housing, as well as 
restrictions on education and employment. Identifying these various control methods 
should precede assuming the North Korean situation in the absence of these control 
mechanism. 
First of all, the public distribution system (PDS) plays a major role that enables 
the North Korean regime to control its population. According to Andrei Lankov, from the 
time when the North Korean government banned private trade in rice and other grains in 
1957 and until around 1990, grains and other foodstuffs could only be acquired, almost 
exclusively, through the PDS. 28  Considering North Korea’s economic downturn and 
famine since the 1990s and the fact that food is vital to people’s daily necessities, the 
PDS functions as one of the most powerful political tools to mobilize the population and 
reward people’s loyalty to the regime. Indeed, the North Korean government distributes 
not only food but also basic consumer goods based on hierarchical order in the society.  
Second, all North Korean males are required to work for the state. After 
graduation from high school, all North Koreans are assigned to their jobs by the state 
regardless of the individual’s will. North Korean people are not allowed to look for jobs 
themselves, and changing one’s job needs an approval of the authorities. 
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Third, the North Korean government’s control even penetrates an individual’s 
private life.  Many authoritarian states strive to keep an eye on the population but not as 
deeply as North Korea regime does. A person’s place of residence can be changed only 
with the approval of authorities. North Korean people are not allowed to travel without a 
special travel permit, to be issued by the authorities. Lankov points out that, even under 
Stalin’s rule, short-term domestic travel was possible in the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).29  
Along with this travel permit system, the North Korean regime has also developed 
an institution, called inminban, to enforce surveillance on its population. The term 
inminban means “people’s group” in North Korean and includes 20 to 40 families in a 
certain residential block. Thus, every North Korean belongs to an inminban. While the 
inminban is headed by an official, the police also supervise the inminban, and the head 
officers must report suspicious activities, such as anti-regime comments and behaviors, to 
the resident police officer. In this regard, the inminban plays a major role in enforcing 
control over North Koreans. The people’s behavior is tightly controlled and restricted by 
this system. 
Another significant control system of the North Korean regime is the 
organizational life that is designed to enforce surveillance and ideological indoctrination. 
Every North Korean has to belong to an organization such as the ruling Korean Worker’s 
Party, trade union or agricultural union. These organizations often hold meetings through 
which every participant is supposed to confess his/her misdeeds as judged by the state’s 
ideological standards. In a sense that people would not admit one’s misbehavior that 
might to lead to serious punishment, the system could have only a demonstration effect. 
However, in the meeting (a so-called self-criticism and mutual criticism session), a 
participant is expected to criticize the particular person for his/her misdeeds. 
In the Kim Il-sung era, these control systems functioned to keep the population 
under the regime’s control. Unfortunately, there is no evidence showing to what extent 
these different social control systems functioned in making people loyal to the regime. 
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However, there is a common feature in these different control mechanisms. That is, there 
are certain people who have privileges while the others are controlled by these privileged 
few who are given authority by the regime. Even if one cannot measure the North Korean 
people’s degree of assimilation into the Kim family regime’s way of control, it is obvious 
that people are not all treated the same by the regime and that dissension derived from the 
gulf between the privileged and disadvantaged is likely to exist. 
In the PDS, while the privileged inhabitants of Pyongyang received more than 
half of their grain rations in rice, the countryside inhabitants receive corn and wheat flour. 
On special occasions, distinguished individuals are even given luxury consumer goods 
such as wristwatches and TV sets as presents from the Great Leader. 30  Preferential 
treatment is also seen in the process of assigning the jobs. While some are forced to work 
as farmers, those who are seen as both academically smart and, most of all, politically 
reliable are chosen by the state and allowed to pursue a college education.  
In addition, the restriction on longtime residence and short-term travel 
demonstrates differentiation within the North Korean people. The situation of North 
Korea cities other than Pyongyang and Kaesong is in dire straits. Apartment buildings 
have no heat or windows. Without any sign of mechanization, farmers still use old oxen 
to till the land. The roads are cracked, and the mountains have been stripped of all of their 
trees. As Victor Cha points out, “One cannot live in the capital city without some 
connection to the party, military, or bureaucracy.”31 In this regard, it is likely that people 
residing in Pyongyang are privileged and they are more likely to be differentiated from 
people in suburban areas.  
Considering the way the control mechanism works through inminban and 
organizational life, there seems to be a disparity between those who control and monitor 
commoners and those being controlled and monitored. The head of inminban is one of 
the privileged people in the society. Since an inminban head plays a major role in the 
enforcement of domestic travel control and general surveillance, he/she is supposed to 
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report any suspicious conduct of inminban members. It is hard to say that all inminban 
heads are separated from others in terms of ideological assimilation to the regime and 
loyalty to their supreme leader. It is also uncertain whether these people who are more 
privileged than the average North Korean person will cooperate with or resist stabilizing 
forces. Of significance is the fact that these people have benefited more than anyone else 
in their system, and the gap between inminban head and members is likely to exist.  
a. Recent Changes in the Social Control System 
According to experts, the aforementioned social control systems, which 
were mostly established in the Kim Il-sung era, have been less effective since the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, when North Korea faced serious famine and natural disasters, the state-run 
economy collapsed and so did the PDS. People sought food for survival, and farmers 
chose to start growing their own food as the alternative to death by starvation. In urban 
areas, the old state-run economy was replaced by private economic activities associated 
with what is described as a black market. According to Lankov, most urban families 
began bartering household items for food, and they started to trade their household 
production with each other, which is not allowed in the North Korean system.32 As illegal 
private markets emerged, some people accumulated their own money. The changes 
continued to spread among people despite state restrictions and several economic reforms 
to reinstate order. For instance, it is estimated that the share of income from private 
activities reached almost 80 percent of the total income of North Korean households 
between 1998 and 2008. 33 More than two-thirds of defectors admitted that half or more 
of their income came from private business, and it was also found that more than 50 
percent of former urban residents purchased as much as 75 percent of their food from the 
market.34 In addition, more than 50 percent of all restaurants and shops were privately 
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owned in 2009. 35  The emergence of private capital indicates that there seems to be 
another strong motivation in people’s lives other than ideology and state guidance.   
Along with privatization, there are many other changes that indicate a loss 
of social control, such as the loss of control over domestic travel and the Sino-DPRK 
border. North Koreans were and still are expected to apply for a travel permit for an 
overnight trip outside the borders of their country or city. However, as the economy 
collapsed in 1990s, not only typical citizens but also enforcers and indoctrinators faced 
the threat of starvation. As these bureaucrats have begun to turn a blind eye to illegal 
activities in exchange for bribes, the system of regulations and surveillances is slowly but 
inexorably crumbling. For instance, according to Lankov, nowadays one can bribe a 
police official to get a travel permit. Some North Koreans now have radios, which used to 
be seen as a political crime, and they can cross the border by paying bribes.36  Indeed, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 indicates that North Korea is ranked 174 out of 176 
countries in terms of public sector corruption.37   
As a result, some North Korean people now can access information about 
South Korea by watching TV and listening to radio, and they are increasingly aware of 
South Korea’s prosperity and North Korea’s relative deprivation. According to Lankov, it 
seems that in border areas and major cities, some 70 to 80 percent of all households were 
in possession of a DVD player by early 2012.38 The possession of a DVD player itself is 
not illegal, but it can be assumed that more or less all these families have watched South 
Korean movies and TV dramas, which are illegal. The growing awareness of the outside 
world is changing North Korean attitudes toward their regime. Internal dissent is not 
unheard of anymore, and even occasional riots have been reported. 39  
The significance of organizational life has also declined since the 1990s. 
As the social control erodes, people have begun to ignore the institutions of state that kept 
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them under surveillance. The weekly mutual-criticism and indoctrination meetings have 
become less frequent and lost their intensity in the Kim Jong-il era. With bribery, one can 
skip this session in order not to miss profit at the market. Overall, there is no doubt that 
the failure of the North Korean economy has created conditions for individual economic 
initiative and pervasive corruption.  
Economic privatization and incremental loss of social control, however, 
should not be overestimated and undermine the regime. Despite all these palpable 
changes in people’s daily life, according to their way of thinking North Korea still 
remains one of the most repressive regimes in the world. From many defectors’ testimony 
about difficulties on the way out of their mother nation, one can assume that its 
surveillance system is still second to none in efficiency and brutality. North Korea still 
maintains its control over the population and manages to survive despite all these changes. 
Even some experts such as Alexander Mansourov and Bruce Cumings argue that the 
collapse of North Korea is less likely to happen.40 Nonetheless, the focal point is not 
whether North Korea will collapse or not, but it is that changes are palpable that were not 
present before.  
2. Songbun System 
There is another clue that supports the idea of possible divergence of the North 
Korean people within the control system: the songbun system. The Korean word songbun 
means ingredients or material. The North Korean regime uses the word to refer to one’s 
socio-political background. North Korea’s regime differentiates its people according to 
their family background, loyalty to the regime, and hereditary castes. The regime has 
conducted checking of the family background of every North Korean since 1958. Since 
then, the regime has continually made thorough investigations into people’s family 
                                                 
40 Bruce Cumings, “Why Did So Many Influential Americans Think North Korea Would Collapse?” 
in Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig, and Bernhard Seliger, eds. The Survival of North Korea: Essays on 
Strategy, Economics and International Relations (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 2011), 44–63; 
Alexander Mansourov, “Kim Jong Un’s Domestic Policy Record in His First Year: Surprisingly Good,” 
38north.org. January 15, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/01/amansourov011613/ 
 21 
background and now categorizes the population into three classes and 45 subgroups.41 
Every North Korean belongs to one of three categories: loyal or core, wavering or 
agitating, or hostile.42  Kim Il-sung gave a public speech in 1958 in which he reported 
that the core class represented 25 percent, wavering class 55 percent and hostile class 20 
percent of the population.43 People are usually classified in accordance to what their male 
ancestors did in the past. That is, people whose ancestors contributed to the establishment 
of the Kim family regime are considered members of the core class whereas people 
whose ancestors were former landlords, Christians or defectors are classified as hostile. 
Based on this ascribed status, the chances of an individual obtaining an opportunity for 
social movement are limited. In addition, a recent research found that the size of the 
nutritional categories is about the same as the size of the three social classes.44 It seems 
that the regime was feeding people through the PDS based on their songbun classification. 
That is, the songbun system determined not only the possibility of social mobility but 
also ration levels in the PDS. Likewise, the research also claims that the songbun system 
has affected many aspects of the North Korean people’s lives, such as party membership, 
education, employment, housing, healthcare and so on. In this context, the presence of the 
songbun system implies institutionalized inequality among the people in North Korea. 
a. Recent Changes in the Songbun System 
Economic privatization and incremental loss of social control also lead to 
changes in features of class structure to some extent. The state’s inability to feed its 
people has provided new opportunities. Individuals in most categories of songbun have 
been able to earn some money through their own initiative. For instance, regardless of 
inherent songbun, a member of a hostile songbun could climb to an upper economic class 
by using his or her accumulated private capital. As some privileged economic actors have 
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illegally accumulated wealth, this change has led to an extreme polarization of the 
economy and widespread corruption in society. Thus, not only one’s songbun but also his 
or her economic status has now become an important indicator of social position. In 
addition, a particular individual’s ability to bribe, given accumulated wealth, has helped 
those of the lower songbun classes to overcome restrictions paced upon them by the 
inherent class system, the songbun. 
However, this does not mean that social movement through a change in 
economic status is a common phenomenon and that the class system-based society has 
transformed into a new society. The private market and business have been tolerated only 
as a means of coping with emergencies, and ascension in economic status remains 
dependent on the regime’s existing policy.45 Although bribing one’s way out of police 
trouble or into better colleges, buying better medical service and purchasing better 
housing has provided some alternative avenue for survival, it does not change a deep-
rooted songbun-based social order. Prisoners’ camps still exists, and most lower songbun 
citizens are suffering from heavy-labor jobs. Songbun investigation continues to classify 
every single North Koreans into a songbun category.46 It is still those of higher songbun 
who makes critical decisions. 
Nonetheless, it is significant that the change in class structure implies a 
further complicated and diversified response of North Korean citizens in the case of their 
regime’s collapse. It is not clear whether these wealthy people will flee the country with 
their wealth as some East German businessmen did when the Berlin Wall fell or whether  
they will cooperate with new authorities to keep their vested rights in a new order. It is 
highly probable that these wealthy people’s behavior will be driven by human nature, 
greed and need rather than ideological fervor.  
3. Juche Ideology 
Another element, the most important one, the North Korean regime has used to 
keep control over its population has been ideological indoctrination. After the end of 
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Japan’s cruel colonization, communism in North Korea suggested an ideal model that 
many pre-modern Koreans had dreamed of. Later, many situational factors, such as the 
Sino-Soviet split, the confrontation with South Korea backed up by the United States, 
contributed to the development of a unique North Korean ideology that is a mix of 
Marxist-Leninism, Korean nationalism, Confucianism and anti-Japanese sentiment. 
Given South Korea’s corrupt leadership and poor economic status at the time, juche 
ideology, which emphasized self-reliance and loyalty to the supreme leader, became a 
source of strength and control for the regime. In this sense, juche indoctrination has 
provided the primary basis of regime legitimacy. 
The reason one should not overlook juche in discussing the North Korean 
upheaval is that the ideology runs much deeper than one might imagine. Victor Cha notes 
that juche ideology forms the backbone of the state’s control. 47  North Korean 
constitutional revisions in 2009 prescribe that the juche ideology of the Great Leader Kim 
Il-sung is the sole guiding doctrine for people’s activities.48 Cha also notes that “under 
juche, North Korea could not rely on the good graces of others, it had to fend for itself 
and preserve true Korean identity.” 49  Thus, the juche ideology strongly reflects a 
nationalistic sentiment that resists the infiltration of any imperialistic elements. In this 
sense, according to the juche ideology, it is highly probable that North Korean citizens 
are going to resist any external force trying to liberate them. 
One might say that the ideology could be merely a nameplate that justifies the 
regime’s ruthless control. On the day of Kim Il-sung’s death, the North Korean media 
broadcast hours of people wailing en masse as if it was a spontaneous outpouring. 
However, while some people’s reaction could have been spontaneous, there could have 
been others who were obliged to do so because their survival was at stake. Indeed, the 
inminban kept record of how often people went to the Kim Il-sung statue to show their 
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loyalty and respect.50 Based on the testimony of North Korean defectors who experienced 
the incident at the time, Barbara Demick notes, “In the middle of a crowd of crying 
people, the only natural human reaction is to cry oneself.”51 The North Korean people’s 
mass behavior could be derived from infectious hysteria rather than ideological 
indoctrination. People could be forced to behave under the suppressive regime. It is 
problematic that there is no evidence that shows to what extent the North Korean people 
are indoctrinated by juche ideology. 
Although it is hard to predict people’s response to their regime collapse, again, a 
cordial welcome to stabilizing forces is not likely to happen in North Korea. That is, 
while one doubts the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination, some evidence suggest 
that ideological indoctrination is no less effective than one thinks. According to Demick, 
the death rate in the aftermath of Kim Il-sung’s death increased since many older North 
Koreans suffered heart attacks and strokes.52 Some even committed suicide while others 
starved themselves. In this context, it seems that the cult of personality works to some 
extent and that some people are sincerely loyal to their regime.  
a. Recent Changes in Ideology 
Juche ideology, which has had a significant impact on every aspect of 
North Korea, has also faced challenges as the economy has deteriorated since the 1990s. 
In the Kim Il-sung era, juche indoctrination along with a relatively superior economic 
performance provided the primary basis of regime legitimacy. Although it was 
transformed into a personality cult of Kim Il-sung in the 1960s, people were satisfied 
with their economic status, and the suryong, Kim Il-sung was believed to enable all these 
benefits. The social control mechanism and information blockade also support the regime 
to maintain its control effectively. Since the economy deteriorated in the 1990s, ideology 
has become more important since it is now the only source from which the regime 
derives its legitimacy. 
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However, in the wake of Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 and the economic 
crises that followed, North Korea’s guiding principle has begun to falter, failing to 
provide practical policies to solve the acute economic situation. After Kim Jong-il 
succeeded his father, the regime introduced a set of political slogans such as the ‘red flag 
ideology,’ ‘strong and prosperous nation,’ and ‘military-first policy.’53 This series of 
policy guidelines implies that juche as a sole guiding principle has become less practical 
to promote economic growth. In addition, the emergence of a military-first policy in the 
Kim Jong-Il era, as an attempt to revive the economy by bringing the resources and 
capacity of the military into play further justifies the Kim family regime’s draconian 
control rather than strengthening juche ideology as a practical guiding policy. In this 
sense, it seems that juche has failed to secure the daily necessities for the survival of its 
people.  It is likely that distrust and criticism of the ideology, thus, are bound to surface. 
4. A Garrison State  
a. The Status of The Korean People’s Army 
Since its foundation in 1948, the armed forces in North Korea have never 
been considered less important than any other sector. The North Korean constitution 
declares that “the mission of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is to carry out the 
political line of the military-first policy, and thereby defend the leadership of the 
revolution and safeguard the interest of the working class, in addition to protecting the 
socialist system, achievements of the socialist revolution, freedom, independence and 
peace of the fatherland.”54 Although the military-first-policy only began in 1998, North 
Korea has always regarded the KPA as its highest priority for socialist revolution and 
national unification. The KPA has been an important tool for the leadership to continue 
the regime and control internally, and its capabilities also have played a key role in 
maintaining external relations. Therefore, under the slogan of building a strong and 
prosperous nation, North Korean leaders put so much effort not only into developing 
military capabilities but also in strengthening their control over the armed forces.  
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Especially, in Kim Jong-Il’s era, military status was further consolidated 
under the ideological banner of the military-first policy. This ideological and political 
principle gave top priority to reinforcing the armed forces and placed the KPA at the 
center of all state affairs. In this regard, one of the distinctive features of the North 
Korean armed forces, more precisely the military leadership, is that they are politicized. 
By 1998, Kim Jong-il raised the National Defense Commission (NDC) to the core of 
institutional power and took on the role of the chairman of the NDC. He also granted the 
military organization direct access to the Dear Leader. Patrick McEachern also points out 
that, under Kim Jong-il’s rule, there were many generals who were involved in decision 
making, either directly or indirectly, without having to subordinate political ideas to party 
leaders.55 In this sense, it seems that the power shift toward the military is undeniable in 
the Kim Jong-il era and that rivalry among institutions exists to some extent. On the flip 
side, the Dear Leader’s special affection and reliance on this organization implies that he, 
like most dictators, was suspicious of the military’s extensive coercive potential  
It is uncertain whether the enhanced status of the military is still effective 
in the supreme leader’s system. The latest news indicates that the new young leader has 
much interest in reforming the DPRK’s dire economic situation. However, there is no 
clear evidence to show the changing status of the military (such as constitutional revision 
and reorganization of the system). As long as Kim Jong-il’s system has not been 
modified, it seems that the institution that has the most powerful source of control is 
likely to be under the supreme leader’s direct control. That is, military leadership, one of 
the most privileged segments of the society, is highly likely to remain as the most 
unstable and dangerous group in the absence of this control.  
Another distinctive feature in the KPA is that inequality is also 
institutionalized within its conscription system. Despite the fact that all men in North 
Korea are required to register for enlistment at the age of 14, those who have families 
from the hostile class are excluded from military service.56 In this sense, one might say 
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that the military, other than military leadership, is also considered privileged. In the past, 
troops were provided sufficient food comprised of rice and two or three side dishes that 
were better than the average North Korean people’s meal. According to Lankov, joining 
the military is seen as attractive because soldiers can join the Korean Worker’s Party, the 
most essential prerequisite for social advancement.57  In this context, not only military 
leadership but also the military in general is likely to remain loyal to their regime since 
they are privileged.  
However, one also needs to acknowledge the recent changes in the 
military. The deteriorating economic situation in the 1990s deprived the military of such 
privileges to some extent. Recently, shortages in supply have worsened when the 
international community stopped food aid in response to North Korea’s development of 
nuclear weapons. Party membership is not as highly prized as it used to be. Prolonged 
terms of military service also indicate that being military in North Korea does not mean 
being privileged in North Korean society. It is often heard that the North Korean military 
generates aberrations and offences by abusing its authority, which might damage civil-
military relations. In this regard, although the military-first policy is still in the place, it is 
not easy to say that the military would not be affected by its behavior in the case of 
regime collapse.    
b. Capabilities 
Since its establishment, North Korea has continued to expand its military 
capacity. Up to the mid-1970s, the process of developing military capabilities had 
focused on conventional arms and equipment, giving priority to quantity rather than 
quality. As a result, the size of North Korea’s standing troops is estimated to be 1.19 
million in total.58 Troops are thought to consist of 1.02 million in the army, 60,000 in the 
navy, and 110,000 in the air force.  Noteworthy is that 70 percent of the ground force is 
positioned south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.59 Among them are more than 200,000 
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special operations troops trained for unconventional warfare. These special forces should 
be identified in case of regime collapse; they could be troublesome if they resist 
stabilizing forces. This implies that stabilizing forces need to adopt a selective approach 
according to region and identified target groups.  
Considering the huge task of DDR regarding the size of this targeted 
group, the amount of equipment matters nearly as much as the numbers of troops. North 
Korea has around 2,300 battle tanks, more than 8,500 howitzers, 5,100 multiple rockets 
launchers, and 11,000 antiaircraft guns and other air-defense weapons. When factoring in 
naval and air force equipment, there are many political dangers in the loss of state control.  
More problematic is possession of a large number of strategic weapons. 
North Korea continues to develop nuclear and ballistic missiles as well as chemical and 
biological weapons. According to a 2012 Korean white paper, the updated version of the 
Daepodong missile is assumed to have a range of 6,700 km and can reach the mainland 
of the United States.60 It is also estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500–5,000 
tons of various chemical weapons in multiple facilities throughout the country. 
Regardless of the number of these weapons, it is significant that the loss of control over 
these deadly weapons would lead to catastrophes. Especially, the issue about the 
disposition of a nuclear arsenal in an upheaval raises complicated political and military 
problems among stakeholders. It is highly likely that the conflicting stance of external 
powers on the North Korean nuclear issue in the case of the Kim family regime collapse 
would impede not only the DDR process but also the reconstruction process as a whole. 
c. Reserve Forces 
North Korea’s four military guidelines, which were declared by Kim Il-
sung in 1962, provided the following objectives to arm the military and populace 
politically and ideologically: a cadre-based army, modernization, militarization of the 
populace and a stronghold-based fortified nation. Under this bedrock principle, North 
Korea has mobilized around 30 percent of the population between the ages of 14 to 60 to 
acquire over 7.7 million reserve forces. The North Korea reserve forces are comprised of 
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the Reserve Military Training Unit, the Worker and Peasant Red Guard organized around 
the workplace and regions, the middle school military organization known as the Red 
Youth Guard, as well as paramilitary units. One might argue that North Korea has plenty 
of reserve forces. In addition, those reserve forces maintain a level of training that is 
commensurate with the regular forces. Even worse, every member of the reserve forces is 
given various combat gear, including personal arms, equipment and crew-served 
weapons.61  
5. Implications 
This erosion of ideological fervor, along with the relaxation of social control, 
however, does not necessarily mean that North Korean citizens seem to favor and long 
for other types of governance. Such a simple analogy that North Korean citizens are 
likely to welcome liberation forces in this situation is unrealistic, and there is scant 
evidence to support this idea. Indeed, there is no data by which one can assume how 
North Koreans might think or react to the case of a regime collapse. Again, despite all 
these changes mentioned earlier, North Korea has completed another hereditary 
succession smoothly, and the Kim family regime is still supported by its comrades. Some 
experts even evaluate the new leader’s domestic record in his first year as “surprisingly 
good.”62 Thus, it is not desirable to take a rigid approach over this controversy about the 
North Korean people’s ambivalence. Nonetheless, based on recent changes, this paper 
assumes three critical points that might provide some clues to expect the possible attitude 
of North Koreans in the case of regime collapse. 
First, the North Korean people, despite pressure for uniformity, are highly likely 
to have disguised preferences. North Korea has restricted individual rights and freedom, 
and all citizens have been forced to live a uniform life under the regime’s surveillance 
and control. The control over thoughts through ideological indoctrination and 
organizational life, as well as physical control by various methods indicates that the 
North Korean people are supposed to live and think in the same way. Although one might 
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argue that this unrealistic idea has succeeded to some extent, the truth runs counter to the 
ideal. Poor economic performance has led to privatization that has created a new way of 
thinking. The mindset of capitalism along with the loss of economic control has resulted 
in the loss of social control and widespread corruption. In this context, although the 
regime may look strong and united on the surface, internal cohesiveness is questionable. 
Individuals also are ambivalent, complying with the regime’s demand in the public 
sphere while pursuing their own interests in the private sphere.  
Second, the sense of inequality within society is likely to be pervasive such that it 
might lead to fragmentation among various social groups. Ostensibly, North Korea as a 
socialist regime has nationalized the means of production and emphasized the importance 
of egalitarian values. In reality, it is a viciously unequal society that discriminates against 
its people based on family background and loyalty to the leader. Not only the songbun 
system but also individual opportunities regarding education, occupation, marriage and 
place of residence indicate that the inequality is institutionalized within the society. In 
particular, the gap between the privileged members living in Pyongyang and ordinary 
people living in suburban areas is seen in the conditions of daily life as well as 
opportunities for social advancement. According to Cha, even after the health care system 
was broken after decades of economic crisis, the social elites, military, and party 
members who belong to these privileged groups are still able to get services, although no 
one else can.63  
Last is the noteworthy finding that the information flow and blockage in North 
Korea varies according to region and class (but not necessarily songbun). The influx of 
outside information has been controlled effectively, at least in Kim Il-sung’s era. It was 
not as critical to the regime’s stability as it is now. Decades of economic crisis, however, 
have made the legitimacy and stability of the regime more vulnerable to outside exposure 
because of the eroding ideological fervor. In this context, along with many changes such 
as privatization and the loss of social control, the growing awareness of the outside world 
is palpable. However, not all North Korean people have the means to contact the rest of 
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the world. A few descendants of privileged people are able to go study abroad although 
only in certain countries. According to Lankov, during the last 15 years, approximately a 
half-million North Koreans have visited China, where they could see China’s prosperity 
and learn a lot about South Korea by TV and radio.64 These people include privileged 
members of the society, people living near the border and people involved in business. It 
is not clear how far this new consciousness has spread within the society; however, it is 
probable that certain regions including a few major cities and certain groups of people 
have the advantages to acquire this information. That is not to say that these people are 
likely to protest against the regime. Rather, they are more likely to keep silent and adopt 
an ambivalent stance. As some experts also point out, it is also highly probable that 
educated and informed people are more flexible and able to adjust themselves easily to a 
new situation, while the isolated and uninformed are resistant to change. In this sense, it 
is difficult to expect a clear-cut distinction in people’s response.  
In addition, North Korea is one of most militarized states in the world. 
Considering the regime’s reliance upon its military and massive capabilities, including 
strategic weapons, there are some points that one should not forget in dealing with one of 
the largest armed forces in the case of regime collapse.  
First of all, the absence of regime control over its hawkish leadership is highly 
likely to induce the risks of destabilizing the environment. It is difficult to predict 
whether the leadership will be cooperative or not. However, the status of military 
leadership in the regime and privileges that they acquire in the hierarchical society 
indicate that the military leadership might play a leading role in directing certain people’s 
response to the regime collapse. Furthermore, the hawkish stance that military leaders 
have represented in decision making also implies that, although the response among 
military leaders would not be monolithic, there are possibilities of local resistance by 
military leaders.  
Second, the DDR process in North Korea should be swift. Tasks that have never 
been seen in the context of DDR in Africa and other post-conflict situations will be posed, 
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including the disposal of nuclear weapons and massive amounts of conventional 
equipment. Most of all, dangers caused by the loss of control over such deadly weapons 
easily justifies the intervention of neighboring states that might further complicate the 
process of DDR.  In addition, there are thousands of potential insurgent soldiers who 
have received special training in irregular warfare. These members should be identified 
and taken care of before they are mobilized as insurgent forces.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Making predictions about the attitude of the North Korean people in the event of a 
North Korean governmental collapse is difficult. The problems that the collapse of the 
North Korean regime could create, however, arouse the necessity that analysis should be 
accurate. That is not to say that Bennett’s optimistic assumption about how a collapse 
might occur is less likely to happen. This paper is not arguing whether the likelihood of 
the scenario is more benign or less benign. While Bennett focuses on a specific military 
requirement based on certain assumptions, this paper explores the current situation in 
North Korea in an attempt to find a more valid assumption.  
The North Korean regime still maintains its power, and various control methods, 
the class system, ideology, and the military play a significant role in preventing this 
authoritarian regime from falling down. Noteworthy is that these elements are changing. 
In detail, the changes in the control mechanism of the Kim family regime including the 
social control system, songbun system and ideological indoctrination are likely to 
contribute to a divergent response from the North Korean population in the event of 
regime collapse. Two decades of economic crisis damaged the way that the regime 
maintains its control, and the spontaneous emergence of the capitalist mindset in this 
situation is changing North Korean citizens’ way of thinking permanently. Eroding 
ideological fervor also indicates that the North Korean people’s attitude toward the 
upheaval would not be monolithic. Rather, it would be reactive on a case-by-case basis. 
In addition, the status of the military and the regime’s reliance on it further complicate 
the possible situation in the absence of control, suggesting a high possibility of 
insurgency.  
 33 
Overall, the analysis made in this chapter suggests that assuming people’s 
responses and attitudes in upheaval is more like a process problem than a static problem. 
North Korea is an authoritarian state in which control systems along with ideological 
indoctrination are projected onto its subjects. Analyzing such a unique system and current 
statistics is helpful to predict a probable anarchic situation in the case of regime collapse. 
The ROK Army needs to prepare a contingency plan based on these statistics and 
predictions. However, uncertainties caused by lack of information inside North Korea 
still suggest that close observance and flexible policy prescription are required as any 
future DDR process proceeds. In this sense, classifying different hypothetical methods of 
North Korea’s collapse will be necessary in preparing the contingency plan, and such 
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III. NORTH KOREAN REGIME COLLAPSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Assuming the probable situation in the wake of a North Korean regime collapse is 
more like a process problem. One can predict upheaval and prepare a contingency plan 
by analyzing the current social control system and by assuming the absence of such a  
control system. In this context, the author would argue that it could be easier to expect the 
North Korean people’s response to be akin to the one they had to their great marshal’s 
death in the Kim Il-sung era, but not in these days. Because of the decades of economic 
crisis since the 1990s, North Korean society is not as monolithic as it used to be. The dire 
economic situation has resulted in a capitalist mindset, and the emergence of private 
capital has increased social fragmentation that already existed due to an institutionalized 
inequality. The collapse of the state-run economy has caused the loss of social control 
along with eroding ideological fervor. Such changes in North Korean society complicate 
the expectations for the North Korean attitude toward upheaval. Given the complicated 
dimensions of North Korean society, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is difficult to 
expect how people will react to the collapse of the Kim family regime and stabilizing 
forces based only on analysis about the current status of North Korea. Therefore, it is 
better to know what variables will affect the process of the regime falling down. 
Identifying how these variables and different dimensions created by a correlation of 
variables will change North Korean citizens’ attitude toward their regime collapse is 
helpful for contingency planning.   
In this sense, the author would argue that it is desirable to assume a probable 
situation based on critical uncertainties that affect the process of regime collapse. To 
guarantee the success of DDR in a post-conflict North Korea, one should know the 
environment in which DDR is implemented. Analyzing how the North Korean regime 
collapsed, in this context, would help to better understand the probable situation in which 
DDR is implemented. Thus, this chapter suggests four probable scenarios based on 
different variables and tries to depict the possible environment in the wake of a North 
Korean regime collapse. 
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B. REGIME COLLAPSE 
1. Defining the Status of Regime Collapse 
Assuming probable situations in the case of a North Korea regime collapse raises 
a couple of questions. The first question is how one can define the status of collapse? It 
seems a difficult question and, indeed, there is no single definition of the status of regime 
collapse. Max Weber explains a failed state by determining whether a government 
maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. According to Weber, North Korean 
regime collapse can be defined as the status in which Pyongyang no longer maintains its 
central control over its military, the Korean People’s Army. Weber’s explanation 
provides a basic element in determining the status of regime collapse: the absence of 
control. Bruce Bennett also points out that North Korea becomes a failed state if the Kim 
family’s authority is challenged, but no one manages to establish political control.65  
Considering stakeholders’ interest, especially that of the ROK and United States, 
with regard to the North Korean regime collapse, the question of defining the regime 
collapse can be replaced by a more practical question: When should the ROK-U.S. 
combined forces intervene in the North Korea upheaval? It is obvious that the U.S. is 
interested first and foremost in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal that directly threatens U.S. 
security and regional stability. 66 In this regard, the United States and South Korean 
governments are likely to intervene in North Korea when they determine the North 
Korean government has lost its control over nuclear weapons and WMDs that can reach 
to the U.S. mainland.   
Of course, with a lack of access to North Korea, it is not easy to assess the DPRK 
domestic situation. For instance, even if North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, or any other 
successor, would be assassinated, the DPRK government could have a contingency plan 
that is designed to show its internal stability to prevent probable intervention by big 
powers such as the United States and China. In this sense, it is necessary to determine the 
appropriate timing for intervention, and the ROK-U.S. alliance should contemplate this 
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timing issue. Therefore, defining the status of North Korean regime collapse should be 
based on close observance of its control over its armed forces and deadly weapons.  
The scope of this thesis, however, will not cover this issue. Instead, it assumes 
that North Korea’s regime has collapsed; by definition it has lost its control over military 
and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, to provide more specific policy prescription, it 
focuses more on critical uncertainties that will induce the loss of control. 
2. Scenarios and Assumptions  
a. Critical Uncertainties 
North Korea could collapse suddenly in any number of ways. Indeed, 
speculation about the survival of the North Korean regime has continued to surface 
periodically. Since Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, not only problems regarding Kim Jong-
il’s health and succession but also a devastating famine in the 1990s and poor economic 
performance have raised concerns of the sudden collapse of the Kim family regime. Thus, 
common and confident were predictions of North Korea’s demise. In this regard, 
previous lines of research on the topic range from identifying factors that would 
contribute to the regime collapse to predicting the spillover effect derived from the 
upheaval. Based on this wide range of scenarios, this research suggests four scenarios by 
analyzing critical uncertainties related to the collapse of the North Korean regime. Dr. 
Wade Huntley defines a critical uncertainty in formulating scenarios and assumptions by 
explaining three major aspects of it.67 First, it should be uncertain. Second, it should be 
critical. Third, critical uncertainties should not be correlated or overlapped in a context.  
Due to a lack of overall information about North Korea, one might say that 
most of the variables are uncertain. Indeed, there are too many uncertain variables that 
might affect the North Korean regime’s collapse. Based on Huntley’s definition, however, 
the author assumes two critical uncertainties to formulating the scenarios that are possible 
at the end of the current North Korean regime.  
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The first critical uncertainty is whether North Korean regime collapse will 
be initiated from the top or bottom. The North Korean regime can collapse by an internal 
crisis as has taken place recently in the Middle East and North Africa. Since the urban 
poor or hostile songbun have suffered under the current regime, the bottom-up protest is 
considered one of the possible triggers to the regime’s collapse. Especially as the 
economic situation has deteriorated, the segment of society that has felt the most pain is 
the urban poor. While farmers could sell their own products in the black market, the 
salaried urban population has been exposed to the inflation and increased cost of living. 
Cha points out that the result is “a potentially unhappy population that is literate, 
educated, and may have more knowledge of the outside world than most others in 
country.”68  
On the other hand, the dire economic situation not only affects the 
possibility of riots from the bottom but also unsettled the loyalty of social elites. The 
elites in North Koran society, such as party members military officers, and government 
bureaucrats, have benefited from the regime’s rule. As some scholars note, the leadership 
doled out benefits to maintain the regime and to retain such elites’ loyalty. However, this 
loyalty is doubtful. The cumulative effect of years of UN sanctions on luxury goods, 
which are supposed to be gifts from the Dear Leader, and the continued decline in the 
economy have damaged the government capacity. Cha also argues that the social elites’ 
loyalty lasts only as long as the regime can continue the handouts.69 Furthermore, while 
Kim Jong-un has to choose his inner circle as his basis of leadership, the circle of the 
elites becomes smaller and smaller due to a restricted capacity to reward their loyalty. In 
this sense, not only the bottom-up revolution but also the top-down protest can be the 
possible source of discontent. These are uncertain but still critical factors that will affect 
the outcome in different ways. 
The second critical uncertainty is the intervention of China. There are 
several stakeholders interested in a North Korean regime collapse other than the ROK 
government. Among these stakeholders, the United States and China are the most 
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important actors that will affect the process. North Korea remains one of the most critical 
security challenges in Northeast Asia for the U.S. because of North Korea’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles and its willingness to proliferate such 
weapons.70 In this regard, many experts note that the United States cannot stay away 
from the DPRK and will intervene in North Korea anyhow.  
Uncertainty surrounds Chinese intervention in North Korea in the wake of 
a North Korean regime collapse. More precisely, it is uncertain if stakeholders can 
cooperate rapidly. Countries might send their militaries in without coordination to 
stabilize the region or to secure their interest. The consequence of such a poorly planned 
and coordinated response to a regime collapse in North Korea is dangerous. China is 
highly likely to intervene. Bennett points out that justification of intervention ranges from 
border control to elimination of WMDs, as well as a humanitarian crisis that is probable 
in the absence of state control. He also notes that China’s PLA reportedly has developed 
contingency plans for humanitarian, peacekeeping and counter-WMD-related missions in 
North Korea.71 According to a recent report of the U.S. Senate, regardless of the impetus 
for North Korean regime collapse, China will respond to safeguard its own commercial 
interests, and to assert its right to preserve the northern part of the peninsula within 
China’s sphere of influence.72 Despite the strong chance of Chinese intervention, a prior 
consultation with China is in doubt.  
Given these two critical uncertainties, the author assumes four scenarios 
on how North Korea will collapse. The first scenario is based on the assumption that 
North Korea would collapse by bottom-up protests and that the ROK-U.S. alliance would 
fail to coordinate with China in controlling the situation. The second scenario suggests 
the circumstance in which the North Korean people, the urban poor and others, if any, 
stand against the Kim family regime and its followers, and South Korea, the United 
States, and China conduct a joint stabilization operation. Likewise, the third and fourth 
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scenarios differentiate variables to create different dimensions of upheaval. All these 
scenarios focus on the North Korean people’s attitude toward stabilizing forces to assume 
the possible circumstances in which the DDR is implemented.  
The four resulting scenarios are depicted in Figure 1. 
 Collapse from Top  
China Intervenes 
without coordination 
#4 #3 China Does Not 
Intervene 
(Intervene with 
coordination) #1 #2 
 Collapse from Bottom  
Figure 1.  Four Potential Scenarios for DDR Implementation 
The following analysis also traces the impact of key factors discussed in 
Chapter II, namely the social control system, songbun system, juche ideology and 
military. All these elements are likely to interact with the environment in different ways, 
such that they affect the process of regime collapse as well as post-collapse stabilization 
efforts.  
b. First Scenario 
The first scenario assumes that the regime collapse starts from the urban 
population that is literate, educated, and may have been exposed to the outside world 
directly or, at least, indirectly. This group is faced with a higher cost of living and 
delayed salary disbursements from the government. There is some evidence that supports 
this assumption, about the spontaneous outbreak of popular discontent. Victor Cha points 
out that the urban population once benefited from the regime, which may give them cause 
to want to regain those advantages. 73 The year 2011 saw a local riot, caused by an 
unsuccessful fruit peddler’s public suicide in Tunisia, quickly develop into a nationwide 
revolutionary movement. The collapse of the Ceausescu regime, one of the most 
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repressive communist regimes in the 1980s, in Romania was initiated by one incident 
when the security police attempted to arrest a popular priest.  The political demands of 
the people of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), which was once believed 
to be one of the most stable of the communist regimes, eventually led to the total collapse 
of Erich Honecker’s regime. North Koreans may seem to be too terrified, isolated and 
distrustful of one another to emulate the Arab Spring of 2011, the Romanians of 1989, 
and the political shift in the GDR of 1989. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, changes in North Korea are palpable. The government control is weakening, and 
the knowledge of the outside world is spreading while the fear is diminishing. In this 
context, a similar scenario is not impossible in North Korea. 
Bottom-up collapse implies two probable situations in the absence of 
control. First, as seen in the Arab Spring, the removal of the Kim family regime does not 
necessarily mean a stable regime succession to a democratic one. Lankov also argues that  
“there is little reason to expect a North Korean revolution to be velvet.”74 The situation in 
post-revolution North Korea might become quite violent because the interests of the 
ruling elites and a majority of the population are likely to be different. While common 
North Koreans pursue democratic and nationalist idealism, the social elites are likely to 
have different opinions about the collapse of the current regime from which they once 
benefited. It is highly probable that these people understand that they will not be able to 
maintain their privileges. Some of them will be afraid that they might be persecuted by 
enraged commoners. Therefore, the second possible situation is an insurgent movement. 
The possibility of resistance by the social elites, such as higher party members, military 
leaders and bureaucrats cannot be excluded. Considering the institutionalized inequity 
and fragmentation among people under the Kim family regime’s rule, these expectations 
are not that exaggerated.  
Another variable in the first scenario is the Chinese intervention without 
coordination with the ROK-U.S. alliance. While South Korea and the United States have 
developed their own contingency plan to cope with the upheaval in North Korea, China 
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has also developed their own contingency plan, the so-called “Chick Plan.”75 While the 
exact details of the PLA’s plans for responding to the collapse of the North Korean 
regime remain a national secret, Nick Miller argues that the PLA has three types of 
contingency plans for the upheaval in North Korea. Those are humanitarian aid for 
refugees, peacekeeping to serve as civil police and preventing the spread of nuclear 
proliferation in the region. Not only will the chaotic situation and its side effects will 
have a negative impact on China but also economic and territorial issues along with 
historical claims on the Korean Peninsula will justify Chinese intervention in the wake of 
a North Korean regime collapse.76 In addition, the PLA indeed has the capability to reach 
Pyongyang in a few hours. 77 
The problem is that, despite the possibility of Chinese intervention, 
multilateral planning for the contingency in North Korea that involves China has been 
stymied. China seems reluctant to provoke the Kim regime by mentioning its contingency 
plan with its enemies, the ROK and United States.78 Furthermore, even if multilateral 
planning happens, it might be hard to reach a consensus because the interests of China 
and the United States related to North Korea, regional stability and denuclearization, are 
not the same as many experts point out. 
Given this, the author assumes the situation in which Seoul and 
Washington may have no control over the Chinese decision to send the PLA into a 
collapsed North Korea. Given the experience of the Korean War, in a worst-case scenario, 
the risk of escalation between Chinese forces racing south and the ROK-U.S. forces 
racing north might result in a nuclear-level confrontation. However, it is more desirable 
to assume the attitude of North Korean citizens in such a complicated and tense 
atmosphere than to complicate the discussion in the realm of meaningless speculation.  
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It is difficult to predict the North Korean people’s response in a situation 
where a bottom-up revolution along with the hostile confrontation with neighbors in 
North Korea produces manifold complications. However, it is likely that diverging 
responses among the people will be presented. While the urban population who raised the 
revolution is likely to act based on sentiment mixed with democratic and nationalistic 
idealism, as Lankov argues, a very significant part of the current North Korean elite is 
bound to side with China, begging the Chinese government for help.79 It is likely that 
some of those elites who benefited from the former regime much prefer a Chinese-
controlled satellite regime to absorption into South Korea. Thus, it is possible that 
China’s takeover of some part of North Korea and the emergence of a Beijing-controlled 
regime will try to restore law and order to prevent a refugee crisis and nuclear 
proliferation. On the other hand, a Chinese intervention in North Korea is likely to rouse 
the nationalism of North Korean protesters. As seen in the Soviet experience in Eastern 
Europe, nationalist sentiment is not likely to welcome Chinese intervention.80 It is also 
uncertain that these protesters will welcome South Korean stabilizing forces, as 
mentioned earlier.  
In such upheaval, especially in the case that the implosion begins from 
universal protest by the lower class, it is highly likely that the government stops 
functioning. The social control system that has prevented the urban population from 
moving freely and made them live under daily surveillance is likely to be halted. In 
addition, government programs supplying food, medical care and security are likely to be 
stopped. That is, the situation is likely to induce a humanitarian disaster. 
It is uncertain how songbun will survive in such upheaval. The mass 
protesters’ sentiment could be complicated. However, since the bottom-up scenario 
assumes the urban population’s mobilization derived from their grievances, the songbun 
that institutionalized inequity among people is likely to implode at the end. It is also 
possible that songbun occasions a schism among people. Songbun differentiates people in  
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every aspects of their lives, and the grievance and rage caused by inequality could bubble 
just below the surface. Therefore, stabilizing forces should understand possible divisions 
and complications caused by songbun.  
Likewise, juche, which has provided the regime’s legitimacy, is likely to 
fade away. As the information blockage that has blinded the North Korean people 
becomes weak in the wake of regime collapse, most North Korean people will face the 
truth about the divine Kim family’s depravity. It might take some time for every North 
Korean person to realize the irrationality of juche. However, in a situation where the 
urban population begins to crush the old legacies of tyrants, songbun and juche that have 
supported the regime’s rule are likely to disappear eventually. That is not to say that 
songbun and juche do not matter in the wake of regime collapse. One should consider 
that these elements of North Korean society have existed more than 60 years.  They will 
disappear in the long term, but they will not yet be gone as stabilizing forces move into 
North Korea.  
It is most problematic that the military leaders’ attitudes remains highly 
uncertain. Regardless of the scenario, military leaders who have resources and power are 
likely to make decisions on their own in the absence of a supreme leader. Thus, as 
Bennett points out, they could decide to invade South Korea or raise insurgent 
movements against the ROK-U.S. stabilizing forces. Former members of the special 
forces who are capable of many activities, could commit crimes individually or be used 
as a tool for an insurgent movement. Some of them could cooperate with either Chinese 
or Koreans to take advantage of the situation, but their preference and intention will be 
uncertain.  
Overall, the dimension of two variables, bottom-up revolution and 
uncoordinated intervention of neighbor countries, suggests manifold complications in 
preparing a contingency plan. 
c. Second Scenario 
The second scenario assumes that the international environment is less 
hostile and more coordinated among major stakeholders while the bottom-up revolution 
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still impacts the regime collapse. In spite of Chinese reluctance to coordinate contingency 
planning with the ROK and U.S. governments, there are a couple of reasons that support 
the possibility of multilateral planning in advance. Many believe that China’s policy 
toward North Korea is special and benevolent since it is the sole source of external 
support. Indeed, many agree that China needs North Korea not to collapse. However, it is 
misleading to assume that China will support North Korea unconditionally, accepting the 
risk of confronting the ROK-U.S. alliance. Victor Cha argues that China’s support of 
North Korea derives less from some anachronistic Communist allegiance than the fact 
that it provides mutual advantages.81 He also points it out euphemistically, saying there is 
no love between the two despite their unique relationship. Throughout the events such as 
Beijing’s normalization with South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 and the 
following discords between China and North Korea, it is demonstrated that China will not 
support North Korea blindly. Rather, its preference for sustaining a minimal level of 
stability in North Korea is mostly motivated by economic reasons. In this sense, 
considering the circumstances, short-term and long-term benefits, China can cooperate 
with the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
Once China is in the same boat as other stakeholders, there might be 
controversy regarding who will lead the stabilization operation in North Korea. Lankov 
suggests that it could be a unilateral intervention, either by South Korea (with some U.S. 
involvement) or China. It might be a multilateral joint intervention, such as a 
peacekeeping operation mandated by the United Nations.82 The outcome is likely to be 
varied according to who leads the stabilization operation. Considering legitimacy and 
political burden, a UN mandate might be an optimal way to conduct such an operation. 
Since the UN bureaucracy is often slow and inefficient, the Six-Party Talks mechanism 
can be an efficient alternative. International efforts will focus on stabilization operations 
including humanitarian aid, preventing refugees and securing WMDs and nuclear 
weapons. Such cohesive efforts are likely to result in a less fragmented response among 
people such as a confrontation between pro-China elites and the nationalistic urban 
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population. However, it is uncertain that North Korean citizens will be cooperative with 
peacekeeping forces. Still, one cannot exclude the possibility of the determined resistance 
of the Kim loyalists, especially hawkish and stubborn military leaders.   
In this scenario, while coordinated efforts among stakeholders decrease 
the complication of the situation, the possibility of humanitarian crisis still exists in a 
situation where the government no longer functions. Songbun and juche, regardless of 
Chinese cooperation with the ROK-U.S. alliance, are likely to complicate people’s 
response to outsiders. Military leaders’ decisions remain unpredictable. Chinese 
cooperation does not mean that the North Korean military is likely to cooperate as well. 
Their self-reliance in terms of ideological and historical aspects could affect the leaders’ 
decision in the end, when they have no choice but to give up their vested rights.  
d. Third Scenario 
The third scenario assumes top-down dismantlement within the context of 
coordinated international efforts. It is possible that a power struggle within the leadership 
induces the collapse of the Kim family regime.  Although information is sparse, the 
existence of personal rivalries and different factions within the North Korean regime has 
been the source of speculation, especially after Kim Jong-un came into power.83 One 
might say that these stories are based on hearsay, and the possibility of such a factional 
clash does not appear to be high under the North Korean regime. Nonetheless, factions 
are likely to exist.84 If true, a coup from North Korean elites, such as party members, 
military leaders, and bureaucrats, could become a contest, with certain individuals or 
factions vying for power. Unconfirmed reports of past assassination attempts and military 
purges also indicate that a military-led coup is also quite plausible.85  
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As a result, it is probable that a new regime would eventually emerge 
under this scenario. The possibility of a clean break or a new policy course exists. 
Lankov also admits the possibility of “Pyongyang Spring.”86 Pyongyang Spring can be 
initiated by the new rulers, out of greed, idealism and naiveté. These new rulers might be 
seduced by the glamour of Chinese reforms.  A more positive approach to the Chinese-
style economic reform and a peaceful engagement in the international community can be 
considered. Such changes are likely to be welcomed by the international community, and 
the ROK-U.S. intervention might not be needed. 
However, maintaining such a reformist authoritarian regime would be 
difficult. The new regime would not be one that draws its legitimacy from the Great, 
Dear or Supreme leaders that the North Korean citizens once believed as their sole source 
of control. While North Koreans’ ideological fervor is being replaced by a new way of 
thinking, capitalism and individualism to some extent, ideological indoctrination is still 
likely to affect the common people’s way of thinking, especially that of the old 
generation. Not only ideology at the level of commoners but also rivalry among different 
institutions at the level of leadership is problematic in producing a governing regime that 
enjoys broad-based support and legitimacy. McEachern’s research unveils the evidence 
of disunity among North Korea’s political institutions. Therefore, it is not certain that 
removal of the Kim family regime will bring about the North Korean people’s more 
positive attitude toward an internal political revolution and a less belligerent and more 
engaging North Korea in the international community. A prolonged, divisive and even 
violent power struggle is not out of the question. As Lankov points out, once a loser in a 
factional clash decides to go down fighting and makes the conflict quite public, such an 
open clash might jeopardize the regime’s stability. Many people will perceive this lack of 
unity at the top as a sign of the elites’ inability to keep the situation under control which 
might allow them to express their grievances.87 Fortunately, an advanced coordination 
helps the international community and stakeholders cope with such upheaval in a way 
that will not add to the chaos in North Korea.   
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In this scenario, since changes from the top level could be less universal 
and violent compared to the urban population’s broad protests, side effects could be less 
severe. However, assuming that a new regime fails to sustain stability and control, the 
top-down regime collapse is also likely to face a humanitarian crisis due to a lack of 
public supply and refugee problem. If the new regime loses its legitimacy and support 
from the public, long-term consequences of such a collapse will not be different from the 
bottom-up revolution.  
Songbun and juche are also less problematic in situations where the 
regime collapse begins with rivalry among factions, not with public grievances caused by 
institutionalized inequality. People might not even be able to acknowledge the situation, 
which is caused by a power struggle among high officials. However, one should not 
ignore the possible impact of such elements on the population in the absence of 
authoritarian rule. 
The military is a more dangerous element in this scenario. The bottom-up 
revolution could restrain the military leaders’ decision to conduct military action against 
outsiders since they could face an angry population against them. However, in this 
situation where military leaders or factional leaders are free from public grievance against 
authoritarian rule, the options for those who are capable and want to keep their privilege 
are various.  
e. Fourth Scenario  
The fourth scenario, however, assumes another twist on the same scenario. 
If China pursues unilateral methods in solving the North Korean political upheaval, it is 
also probable that China might decide to encourage a group of ambitious people to 
challenge the old guard of the former regime. It has already been mentioned that China 
has many reasons and justifications to intervene in North Korea (such as economic, 
territorial and historical interests). At the same time, the author also argued that China 
could abandon North Korea or, at least, not support North Korea blindly if dealing with 
the country’s collapse is outside of its interest. In the case of a top-down revolution, there 
are some reasons that China is likely to act immediately to restore order in North Korea. 
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More precisely, China prefers to maintain status quo, and it will probably try to maintain 
North Korea’s existence and stability regardless of the regime type and person who is in 
power.  
China has many reasons to prefer North Korea’s existence to its collapse. 
First of all, North Korean riots and any kind of protests against the regime are likely to 
affect Chinese domestic stability, which is significant to its economic growth, as well. It 
is obvious that North Korea’s implosion will cause instability in the region. As previously 
mentioned, China will have to deal with refugee flows and the threat of WMD 
proliferation that will consume its money and efforts. Lankov points out, “Any 
disturbance in adjacent areas might divert resources and in the worst case scenario might 
even trigger some unrest in China itself.”88 In this sense, the Chinese government is 
likely to prefer the status quo in North Korea, and there is no reason that it should be the 
Kim family regime.  
Second, the Chinese believe that any change in the status quo on the 
Korean Peninsula that would give South Korea, under U.S. influence, a position directly 
on China’s border could be a fundamental threat to Chinese interests. North Korea is a 
part of the status quo on China’s northeast border that has been in existence since the 
tenth century. Since China is a country with centuries of border disputes with others 
surrounding it, the Chinese want to consider the Yalu and Tumen Rivers as the 
permanent and unchanging northeast border. Victor Cha claims that this Chinese 
perception of its Korean border is a more critical reason to support North Korea than the 
views in the United States.89 Despite North Korea’s bad behavior and Beijing’s following 
punishments that have been seen in many different ways, China desires to maintain a 
minimal level of stability in North Korea. 
As a result, Chinese efforts to maintain a minimal level of stability are 
likely to be addressed by a reformist authoritarian regime. The winning side in a power 
struggle is likely to prefer a less radical direction, such as Chinese-style governance, 
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rather than a radical change to South Korea’s democracy. Thus, in such a situation, the 
ROK and U.S. alliance would have no reason to intervene in the upheaval other than to 
provide humanitarian aid and border control. Therefore, the top-down revolution seems 
to create a more favorable situation to China. That is not to say that the top-down 
revolution with Chinese intervention will produce stability in North Korea. Still, 
legitimacy of the new regime would be in doubt among many North Koreans, and 
nationalist sentiment might emerge, as many experts point out, depending on the degree 
of the new leader’s reliance on external patrons and intervention.  The ROK and U.S. 
alliance needs to respond to these changes.  
3. Common Traits in All Scenarios  
The previously described scenarios indicate uncertainties and dangers in the case 
of a current regime collapse. In each scenario, critical uncertainties create complicated 
circumstances in which DDR will be implemented. It is important to know how all these 
different situations will affect the process of stabilization in North Korea. Although 
varied dimensions of North Korea’s collapse would cause different side effects, a few 
common predictions can be made. Even though these predictions are not exactly the same 
in all different scenarios, four challenging spillover effects are somewhat overlapped 
across the scenarios.  
First of all, a power struggle in Pyongyang involving competing factions is likely 
to happen. While North Korea has emphasized monolithic life and equality, inequality is 
pervasive, and the introduction of capitalism in people’s lives has led to the emergence of 
influential individuals whose power is based on private capital. There is no consensus 
about the idea that the North Korean people are monolithic. In addition, considering the 
status of military leaders who have access to the core of decision making as well as 
transportation and fuel, military leaders are highly likely to be involved in a contested 
leadership crisis. As Bennett also points out in his perilous scenario depicting North 
Korea’s future, North Korea could become a warlord state where civilian leaders and 
military leaders vie for control and resources.90 In this sense, the power struggle among 
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factions or individuals is likely to happen in the absence of the Kim family regime’s 
control. However, a new regime or leader’s way of achieving legitimacy might be 
different in each scenario. For instance, it will not be easy for the new regime to gain 
legitimacy, something like the Kim family regime once had, in the context of the bottom-
up revolution scenario. The people do not seem to want another authoritarian ruler once 
they start to express their grievances, as seen in the case of the Arab Spring. Meanwhile, 
a change from the top could produce a less violent situation in which a power struggle is 
restricted to higher-level leadership. Likewise, the characteristics of such a struggle will 
also be affected by whether China will support one side or not. Therefore, although one 
can imagine the power struggle in an attempt to fill the power vacuum, depicting a 
likelihood of the situation will not be as easy as one might expect. 
Second, the most commonly feared spillover effect is the humanitarian crisis and 
following exodus of refugees. Since the 1990s, the agricultural sector is chronically 
incapable of providing enough food to feed the people, and the food situation had become 
dire. Considering the fact that North Korea continues to depend heavily on foreign 
assistance, suspension of food aid from the international community, since the North 
Korean nuclear crisis, is also worsening the food situation. Although the PDS is not 
functioning as well as in the Kim Il-sung era, some North Korean citizens still rely on 
insufficient food supply from the PDS. According to a recent source, more than half of 
the total population of North Korea, around 16 million people, still relies on the PDS. 91 
In this regard, if the loss of control results in a malfunction of the delivery and 
distribution of food and other assistance, the situation could become critical in North 
Korea. Victor Cha also points out that “when the regime eventually collapses, what is 
likely to be revealed is one of the worst human rights disasters in modern times.92  
The food crisis is closely related to a refugee problem. As its economy has been 
deteriorating, capitalism has crept into North Korea to fill the gap between the people’s 
demand and regime’s incapability. North Korean citizens have now become increasingly 
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aware of the outside world and the prosperity of China and South Korea. Since the 
heavily mined and guarded demilitarized zone poses formidable challenges to reaching 
South Korea, China would be the desirable destination. Actually, it is estimated that 
400,000 North Koreans crossed into China in search of food during the 1995–1997 
famine.93 The breakdown of the North Korean internal security system is likely to reduce 
the restrictions on such movements of the hungry masses as well. It is clear that the 
Chinese worry about refugee flows into their country if government control breaks down. 
In this context, the pressure within neighboring countries, especially China and South 
Korea, to intervene and provide assistance would certainly grow. This might induce 
sensitive political and operational challenges to the process of DDR. Therefore, the issue 
of border control between North Korea and China should be anticipated.  
However, this possible refugee disaster also depends on the scenarios. For 
instance, if China could intervene before most North Korean people recognize that they 
need to move in order to get food, the aspect of the refugee problem will be less 
problematic than experts point out. Indeed, China is believed to closely observe North 
Korean internal circumstances. As previously mentioned, China also has reasons to 
prevent refugee flow into its territory. Therefore, the aspects of food and refugee crises 
vary in different scenarios.  
The third spill-over effect is a possible loss of control over North Korea’s 
stockpile of WMDs. Based on the assumption that the military would be responsible for 
the stockpiles, the fraying cohesion of the military in the absence of regime control would 
pose serious concerns within neighboring countries. These concerns over the proliferation 
of WMDs would likely provide even stronger pressure on neighbors to intervene. This 
issue would become an urgent priority for the U.S. The instability of control over WMDs 
could lead to rapid proliferation and become a global crisis posing a direct threat to the 
United States and other states. According to Bennett, not only stockpiles but also human  
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resources such as a cadre of scientists and engineers who developed North Korea’s WMD 
programs should be identified and controlled, since they could spread their WMD 
knowledge.94  
Although the loss of regime control might pose concerns of WMD proliferation, 
the aspects of the issue will be different from case to case. In the context of a bottom-up 
scenario, the problem caused by the loss of control over the military is more problematic 
than in the situation where the military still keeps its guards in front of the WMD sites.  
Thus, in the context of top-down scenarios, the ROK-U.S. alliance should consider 
building trust with pro-democracy or pro-ROK-U.S. forces first, rather than intrude into a 
WMD site in an effort to secure them. 
Fourth, the most problematic situation common to all scenarios that would impede 
the process of DDR in the wake of government collapse in North Korea would be the 
outbreak of insurgency. Since inequality is institutionalized within North Korean society, 
it seems that fragmentation within various groups of people is possible. That is, there are 
certain people who have been discriminated against based upon their songbun and, 
recently, the rich-poor gap. Grievances that have been brewing under the surface due to 
the regime’s control are likely to be expressed in the absence of existing social order. Not 
only juche indoctrination, which established a rigid foundation of anti-imperialist 
sentiment, but also privileges that some groups have had would result in resistance to, or 
reluctance to cooperate with, stabilizing forces. Although ideological fervor has eroded 
recently, that does not necessarily mean that the North Koreans have become more 
receptive to outsiders. The status of the military, along with its resources including 
WMDs and massive amounts of conventional weapons, would raise a possibility of 
resistance by such a group. That is not to say that insurgency is expected from whole 
military units. Rather, a contested leadership crisis could lead to the defection of certain 
North Korean military units out of defeat and desperation. Some North Korean soldiers 
could go home and police would not show up for work, as happened with Iraqi soldiers 
and police at the end of central government control in that country. In addition, a lack of 
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food and uncertainty about who is in power could further fuel a potential of insurgency. 
Hunger would encourage criminal activity, and people would need protection. As in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, militias would emerge to fill the security vacuum, providing people 
with protection from looting and banditry. In this sense, a collapse of the Kim family 
regime would create serious instability in North Korea.  
Meanwhile, the aspects of insurgent movements can be differentiated by the 
situation. For instance, while the bottom-up revolution and following prolonged power 
struggle among leadership can raise the dangers of insurgency, the top-down change and 
timely supports from neighbors can normalize the function of government swiftly. Thus, 
in such context, although grievances derived from illegitimacy of a new government 
might still exist, the possibility of insurgency will be different from complete chaos, 
which is formed by the bottom-up revolution and hostile confrontation between China 
and the ROK-U.S. alliance in North Korean territory.  
Overall, these problems in the absence of state control that have been suggested 
by many experts are possible and overlap across the scenarios. However, these problems 
are varied, as are their effects on the process. That is, it is difficult to predict a common 
possible situation in all scenarios. Humanitarian risk is predictable in the loss of state 
control, but the level of significance of the problem depends on the duration of the power 
vacuum and the timing of external aid. Likewise, the proliferation of WMDs and risks of 
insurgency are also affected by the way that other variables correlate with each other. 
Thus, the ROK and U.S. alliance should be prepared for all these ripple effects in each 
context of the different scenarios.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Differentiating dimensions of the potential causes contributing to North Korea’s 
collapse provides different scenarios in which post-conflict stabilization would be 
implemented. As shown, whether the collapse of the North Korean regime would be 
initiated either by bottom-up riots or top-down revolution results in complicated but 
somewhat different situations. From the ROK-U.S. alliance’s perspective, Chinese 
intervention also raises concerns of complicating the upheaval by responding to pro-
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China social elites, which is likely to accelerate fragmentation among the people. 
Significantly, although these factors result in varied circumstances, fragmentation among 
people in the absence of authoritarian rule is unavoidable. That is, silent and peaceful 
transition from the Kim family regime to another form of government is less likely to 
happen. A power struggle within leadership is probable, and Chinese support for one side 
in an attempt to maintain stability is probability. Protests from the urban poor population, 
appealing to democracy and nationalism, are likely to clash with the old guard who are 
loyal to the Kim family regime. The duration of this kind of fragmentation is unknown, 
but diverging responses will be a reality. Thus, it complicates the expectations for the 
circumstances in which stabilizing forces would operate. Therefore, preparing for 
disasters, such as humanitarian crisis, risk of WMD proliferation, refugee problem, and 









IV. POLICY RECOMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to know how stable the Kim family regime is and to predict how the 
North Korean regime will collapse other than to say it could happen. Nevertheless, the 
ripple effects and consequences of a collapse, as described in the previous chapters, can 
be substantial not only to the North Korean people but also to neighboring countries. The 
absence of a supreme leader is likely to produce a power struggle among various factions 
to seize the throne. If dismantlement of the regime begins from the bottom of society, this 
political upheaval will be more complicated since mass behavior will be accompanied by 
various sentiments. As government functions stop, it is likely to create a lack of food and 
supplies among the general public and among those who do not have access to the black 
market. A lack of food, insufficient medical supplies, and suspension of government 
subsidies will bring about a humanitarian crisis. Many people in such circumstances will 
try to find a way to survive. North Koreans are more likely to move out of their country 
as many did in the 1990s famine.  Not only this refugee problem but also concerns of 
WMD proliferation in the absence of state control of the military will justify the 
stakeholders’ intervention in North Korea and that will further complicate the internal 
political chaos.  
All these uncertainties complicate any prediction about the people’s attitude 
toward their regime’s collapse and the probable situation in which a stabilization 
operation, precisely the DDR implementation, will be conducted. Considering these 
uncertainties, the previous chapter tried to predict the consequences of regime collapse by 
differentiating the dimensions of two critical uncertainties. Even though it was hard to 
find a common trait that is applicable to all scenarios, each scenario suggested different 
ripple effects that should be prepared for by the ROK-U.S. alliance in advance. In this 
sense, this chapter provides policy recommendations for each scenario, so that the 
stabilizing forces can prepared for and optimize their operations in each circumstance.  
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
This section describes the assumption that is created by varying critical 
uncertainties, and considers problematic issues in each scenario. Then, policy 
recommendations are suggested.  
1. Policy Recommendations for the First Scenario 
The first scenario assumes that the bottom-up revolution will request for changes 
in North Korean society and that China will intervene without coordination with others. 
In such a case, diverging responses will be presented.  While the urban poor population is 
likely to call for a democratic and nationalistic idealism, North Korean elites who 
benefited from the former regime are likely to prefer a Chinese-controlled satellite regime 
than to be executed.95 Thus, it is possible that China’s takeover of some part of North 
Korea, based on the North Korean elites’ request, and the emergence of a Chinese-
controlled regime will confront the nationalism of North Korean protesters. In such 
upheaval, especially in a case where the implosion begins from universal protest by the 
lower class, it is highly likely that the government will stop functioning. That is, the 
situation in which most of the urban class, which relies on government supplies causes 
the upheaval there is likely to be a humanitarian disaster.  
Therefore, immediately and most importantly, the ROK and U.S. stabilizing 
forces should be prepared to provide sufficient food and other basic needs across all of 
North Korea. If they fail in this task, not only starvation but also disease will pose a 
serious threat that will further complicate the situation, potentially resulting in a refugee 
problem. Since the ROK government alone does not have the capability to provide 
substantial humanitarian aid to North Korea for decades, it must ask for the help of 
international humanitarian organizations to deliver the aid. Thus, the ROK and U.S. 
alliance should be able to secure the areas while moving into North Korean territories that 
are not occupied by China or a China-supported regime. They need to expect possible 
attacks from Chinese-supported North Korean military or spontaneous resistance to  
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outsiders from the local population. Stabilizing forces also need to provide escorts to 
prevent the loss of supplies donated by international organizations, in such an 
environment. 
To continue this type of humanitarian aid, the ROK and U.S. alliance also should 
be able to secure a main supply route, either by securing one of the major ports or 
exploiting a land route through the demilitarized zone. In this sense, combined operation 
by ROK and U.S. army, marine and navy units should be conducted to establish a 
bridgehead to North Korean territory at the very beginning. At the same time, the ROK 
and U.S. stabilizing forces need to strengthen their credibility among the North Korean 
people. A task force team, which is designed to communicate with North Korean 
delegates and to enhance credibility, should be organized and trained in advance. The 
main mission of this kind of unit will be to provide the North Korean people with a 
positive image of stabilizing forces. 
The second task in this scenario is for the ROK and U.S. alliance to avoid military 
confrontation with China. Many experts point out that the ROK government needs to 
coordinate with others, especially the United States and China, in advance to cope with 
the contingency in North Korea. However, as mentioned before, China is reluctant to talk 
about the issue in advance. Accordingly, the first scenario assumes that China intervenes 
in North Korea without coordination with others.  In this sense, China, as it has 
traditionally objected to U.S. operations near its territory, is likely to be concerned about 
ROK and U.S. military operations within North Korean territory after the Kim family 
regime’s collapse.96 Although unexpected local clashes might happen as both sides rush 
toward similar ground objectives, such as the Yongbyon nuclear plant, the ROK and U.S. 
alliance should continue to communicate with China through various channels, including 
the United Nations. The escalation of tension between the two sides should not be 
prolonged.  
However, as Bennett points out, China could decide merely to disrupt Korean 
unification, or it could intervene because of Chinese nationalism to demonstrate its 
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position in the region.97 If such is the case, the ROK-U.S. alliance should insert units 
rapidly into North Korea, and it is desirable that the units are composed of airborne or 
light infantry soldiers so that they can be carried by aircraft. Once these preemptive units 
are in place before China moves into North Korea, regardless of these units’ actual 
deterrence, China needs to contemplate the possibility of confronting the ROK-U.S. 
forces in North Korean territory. However, this does not mean that China would not be 
likely to intervene in North Korea. Not only the mutual defense agreement between North 
Korea and China but also pro-Chinese North Korean elites’ requests for Chinese help are 
likely to justify Chinese intervention. Given the serious threats that a North Korean 
regime collapse would pose to China, China would likely intervene in North Korea. It is 
significant that the ROK must prepare to intervene in North Korea promptly, as soon as it 
recognizes signs of the North Korean regime’s instability.  
2. Policy Recommendations for the Second Scenario 
In the second scenario, China does not intervene, or it intervenes in coordination 
with the ROK-U.S. alliance. This does not mean that there is nothing that China could or 
would do. In either case, the ROK-U.S. alliance needs Chinese support to stabilize North 
Korea effectively. A coordinated intervention effort with China would be the best policy 
option compared to any other alternative. 
First, the bottom-up revolution is likely to produce a pro-Chinese faction or social 
elites who ask for Chinese help, as mentioned before. If China supports these groups 
directly or indirectly, the process of stabilizing North Korea is likely to be prolonged, and 
it will waste more money and time. Even worse, unification with South Korea could be 
impossible due to the division among the North Korean people. Therefore, the ROK and 
U.S. need to persuade China to distance itself from such requests from North Korea. 
They need to emphasize that unification would not harm Chinese interests in the region. 
Of course, this is not a simple issue, and one might argue that it would be impossible. 
However, if China decides not to intervene or to cooperate with the ROK-U.S. forces, 
regardless of its strategic calculation, building credibility between the two sides and 
                                                 
97 Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, 261. 
 61 
focusing on urgent tasks, such as humanitarian crisis, refugee problem, and the risk of 
WMD proliferation, should be possible. In this sense, while monitoring possible 
unofficial support from the Chinese to pro-Chinese North Korean elites, the ROK 
government should try to enhance trust among stakeholders.  
Second, though hard to imagine, it is desirable that stabilizing operations be 
implemented and directed by a combined command. Unfortunately, the possibility of 
joint operations among the ROK, United States and China is very low. Bennett suggests 
that the best alternative would be to define a separation line for the PLA versus the ROK-
U.S. alliance, preventing the two sides from blundering into each other.98 In such case, 
the ROK government should confirm eventual Chinese withdrawal from North Korea by 
either mutual agreement or a UN resolution. The ideal scenario would be that, at the 
initial phase, both sides might be responsible for providing internal security and 
humanitarian aid, securing WMD sites and subduing possible insurgency. Once the risks 
of refugee or criminal activities flow into China and WMD proliferation are controlled, 
the United States and China would withdraw at the same time. If China does not 
intervene, it is likely to secure its border along North Korea, preventing refugee influx 
and WMD flow into China. It sounds like a naïve scenario; however, it is the way to 
prevent possible confrontation between the United States and China that once happened 
in the same place almost 60 years ago.   
3. Policy Recommendations for the Third Scenario 
The third scenario assumes top-down dismantlement within the context of 
coordinated international efforts. In such case, one might argue that a power struggle at 
the top leadership level could progress smoothly so that a new regime could emerge 
without significant instability in North Korea. However, such a regime is less likely to 
acquire legitimacy from North Korean citizens who believe and have been indoctrinated 
with the notion that only one person can give them guidance. Given this, in the third 
scenario it is quite possible that a prolonged, divisive and even violent power struggle 
could lead to the malfunction of government. Even worse, a power struggle from the top 
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leadership is likely to involve military power that might lead to some mobilization by 
factional military leaders. Eventually, a losing side in a factional rivalry could decide to 
go down fighting and make the conflict public; such action would jeopardize any stability 
and complicate the circumstances. Even worse, many North Korean military personnel 
could be led into criminal activity or insurgent movements with their arms, including 
WMDs. 
The foremost mission in such a situation would be to intervene and calm warring 
parties. There are many principles and lessons from previous peacekeeping operations 
about mitigating between two or more warring parties. Since most parties are fighting for 
their survival, some will come to feel they are losing. According to experts on 
peacekeeping operations, providing material incentives, such as food, money, amnesty 
pledges, and other inducements, in exchange for a cease-fire could work if both sides 
agree on the arbitrator’s suggestions.99 In this sense, the ROK-U.S. alliance and China 
can provide inducements to deescalate tensions between the two. Considering North 
Korean propaganda about the ROK and the United States, China might be the optimal 
mediator at first. The losing side would likely be receptive to such inducements of a 
peace agreement. However, there is a possibility that a winning faction would likely be 
more difficult to convince and that it would continue aggression. In such case, the ROK-
U.S. forces and China might consider coercive methods. One might assess the possibility 
of the U.S. and Chinese intervention in a North Korean civil war. Considering the risks of 
nuclear proliferation and refugee flow into Chinese territory, it is likely that both big 
powers are not going to just watch fire spreading from a distance.  
If power struggle among various factions leads to ROK-U.S. and Chinese 
intervention in North Korea, the possibility of insurgency and criminal activity still exists. 
Bennett points out that “to deal with these threats, the ROK and the United States likely 
need to be prepared to destroy or eliminate the military capabilities of these parties, much 
as the United States has practiced in Iraq and Afghanistan.”100 However, it is essential 
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that the ROK and China simultaneously continue the efforts to make these factions 
abandon such activities by providing inducements. It is also critical that the ROK-U.S. 
alliance and China enhance their relations with the North Korean population since 
insurgent movements will not last long without support from the population.  
4. Policy Recommendations for the Fourth Scenario 
In the fourth scenario, however, if China pursues unilateral intervention, 
mitigating a power struggle and suppressing insurgency would be complicated. The worst 
scenario for the ROK-U.S. alliance would be the establishment of a new pro-Chinese 
regime before the alliance intervenes. Indeed, as mentioned previously, China wants to 
maintain the status quo in North Korea, so it might support one of the factions to restore 
order as soon as possible. If the ROK-U.S. side does not intervene, a factional rivalry 
could be ended soon with Chinese intervention. To prevent North Korea from becoming 
one of China’s satellites, the ROK-U.S. forces need to move promptly and take a side in a 
factional rivalry. China and North Korea might insist on the ROK-U.S. forces’ 
withdrawal from North Korean sovereign territory. Meanwhile, a losing side might need 
protection and a patron for survival. Thus, the ROK-U.S. forces could find an excuse to 
remain involved in the situation. One might argue that such action would likely escalate 
tension in the region. However, if China establishes a puppet government in North Korea, 
unification might be impossible in a certain period of time, and the ROK-U.S. alliance 
would lose leverage regarding North Korean issues. Thus, the ROK-U.S. forces should 
intervene promptly, although the legitimacy of such an intervention is controversial. In 
such a situation, to avoid real confrontation between China and the ROK-U.S. alliance, 
both sides need to define a separate line between them as suggested in the second 
scenario. While negotiating with the Chinese about common threats, the ROK-U.S. 
stabilizing force needs to conduct humanitarian aid and secure WMD sites within its 
occupied area.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATION EFFECTIVE IN ALL SCENARIOS  
Threats posed by the collapse of the North Korean regime are distinct in each 
scenario and depend on the development of the situation. As mentioned in Chapter III, 
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one could expect a humanitarian crisis, complication caused by songbun and juche, as 
well as dangers from military components in the wake of a North Korean regime collapse. 
The severity of the problem, however, would depend on the duration of the power 
vacuum and the timing of external aid and intervention. Thus, it is difficult to predict a 
common possible situation in all scenarios. There is no simple prescription for the 
situation resulting from a North Korean regime collapse. However, there are still some 
issues that are overlapping and problematic in all scenarios. Those issues need to be 
prepared for in common in all contingency planning.  
First of all, the ROK-U.S. combined forces should enhance their readiness. 
Regardless of the scenario, the loss of state control in North Korea would likely result in 
a lack of basic needs such as food and medication, especially in the initial phase. The 
ROK government should be prepared to provide humanitarian aid until international 
organizations or other support arrives. In addition, although U.S. intelligence devotes 
substantial assets to monitoring North Korea, the signs of North Korean instability might 
not be that obvious. Thus, although it might take some time to make a political and 
strategic decision to intervene in North Korea, the ROK-U.S. armed forces should be 
prepared and trained to move into North Korea and to conduct stabilization operations.  
Given that Chinese have better intelligence about North Korea and the risks of a 
humanitarian crisis and WMD proliferation, the odds are against the ROK-U.S. alliance 
unless that alliance decides to intervene promptly after a North Korean government 
collapse. 
Second, the ROK-U.S. stabilizing forces should understand recent changes in 
North Korean society and their impact on songbun and juche. To rebuild a society where 
institutionalized inequality has split people into several groups, stabilizing forces need to 
know the possibility of conflict among the different groups of people and one’s 
exploitation of another to prevent further division of a war-torn society. Ideological 
indoctrination in some people’s minds should be treated carefully in a way that does not 
impede rebuilding a society. While some educated people might be able to adapt to a new 
order easily, others could have difficulties understanding a new environment. Thus, a 
long-term education for those people should be planned in advance, and at the same time, 
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material inducements must be offered to pull people out from an illusionary personality 
cult.  
Third, as all scenarios suggest the potential dangers of military elements such as 
the loss of control over WMDs and special forces, the priority to secure the situation and 
to prevent further complication should be placed on dealing with military elements. 
Regardless of the scenario, the military’s potential action in an upheaval is too uncertain, 
and deadly in the worst case. False optimism will lead to an irremediable situation. Since 
the military is the major target group of DDR, this component should be identified and 
controlled by strong measures, if necessary.  
Lastly, as described in each scenario, coordination among stakeholders is 
positively necessary. The terms “ROK-U.S. alliance” and “ROK-U.S. side” have been 
used frequently in this thesis because it is assumed that the ROK government and the U.S. 
government share a common vision for a contingency in North Korea. If not, then 
developing this kind of contingency plan is unnecessary and meaningless. There is no 
doubt that South Korea cannot conduct this huge task without help from its allies. Many 
UN-led peace operations and U.S.-led stabilization operations demonstrate that post-
conflict reconstruction tasks cannot be successful without coordination among 
stakeholders. Thus, South Korea and the United States should develop a common vision 
for a potential reunification of Korea and for the future role of the ROK-U.S. alliance as 
well as for the continued presence of U.S. forces on the peninsula. The key element in 
preparing for a North Korean regime collapse is coordinating with China. Even though 
China is reluctant to discuss the issue, the ROK and U.S. government, at least, should 
pursue a quiet dialogue with China to discuss common threats and mutual concerns. In all 
scenarios, China is the most uncertain but critical variable. Without transparency and 
credibility between and among the ROK, the United States and China, the gap among the 
North Korean population is more likely to be widened, and the circumstances would 
likely become more complicated.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, one cannot know what is going to happen if the current North Korean 
regime collapses. As this thesis attempted to show, upheaval of any form is likely to be 
highly complicated and messy. That is not to say that interested parties cannot prepare for 
such a catastrophic event in advance. As suggested, each scenario raises certain issues. 
The analysis identified common traits that overlap to some degree in all scenarios. Policy 
recommendations for those common traits are important and necessary in preparing for 
contingency. However, while those preparations will help to meet upheaval, the author 
would argue that those are never enough to solve the problems that will present 
themselves in the case of a North Korean regime collapse. The purpose of this scenario 
making is not to make accurate predictions but to guard against over-confidence and 
optimism about the wide range of uncertainties that will be encountered. Therefore, 
further research on the future trajectory of a poor, restricted and highly armed people in 
the absence of control should be developed to prevent disasters in the region. 
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